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THE STATE AND THE MARKET IN 1800:
LORD KENYON AND
MR WADDINGTON*
I
FREE MARKETS AND THE LAW

In early 1801 the judges of the Court of King's Bench sentenced

Samuel Ferrand Waddington to a fine of £1,000, four months'
imprisonment, and continued imprisonment until his fine was
paid, for criminal behaviour in the markets. An established
London merchant who had lately entered the hop trade, he had
been found guilty by a City of Worcester jury and by a Middlesex
jury in King's Bench of the common-law offence of having
engrossed hops and artificially raised the market price in
Worcestershire and Kent. 1 Waddington spent a year in the courts,
* Earlier versions of this paper were given to the conference on Formation of the
Modern State, St Peter's College, Oxford, 14-16 April 1988; to the Colloque
International sur les processus de criminalisation et de decriminalisation dans le monde
occidental depuis le Moyen Age jusqu'a nos jours, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme,
Paris, 20-2 October 1988; and to the International Conference on Moral Economy,
University of Birmingham, 2 April 1992. My thanks to the participants in those
conferences and to John Beattie, Harry Glasbeek, Joanna Innes, the Rt Hon. Lord
Kenyon DL, Jeanette Neeson, Ruth Paley, Adrian Randall, Nicholas Rogers, Paul
Romney, the late Edward Thompson, Wendy Thwaites and others, for materials or
comments on earlier drafts. Earl Stuart, Dan Condon, Evelyn Bogie and the librarians
of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, gave much assistance, and
the research was done under grants by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada.
1 The law reports give a fragmentary account. See Edward Hyde East, Reports of
Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of King's Bench, 16 vols. (London, 1800-12),
i, 143-66, 167-72 (hereafter 1 East 143, 167), repr. in The English Reports, 178 vols.
(London and Edinburgh, 1900-32), cii, 56-65, 65-68 (hereafter 102 ER 56, 65).
Reported cases are cited hereafter by the standard abbreviation for the original report
and the English Reports version, where one exists. There are three printed trials: A
Summary of the Trial the King v. S. F. Waddington, for Purchasing Hops at Worcester
with Notes by the Defendant (London, 1800), published by Waddington in November
before the final judgement on the Worcester offence; Trial of an Information Filed by
Order of the Court of King's Bench, against Samuel Ferrand Waddington at the Assizes
for the City of Worcester for Engrossing Hops, and Other Misdemeanours Relating to the
Hop-Trade (London, 1800); The Proceedings at Large in the Cause the King v.
Waddington, for Purchasing Hops, in Kent: Also the Pleadings, &c. when the Defendant
was Called Upon for Judgment upon the Verdict at Worcester (London, 1801). This last
was probably also published by Waddington. For a chronology of the cases and other
( cunt. on p.

102,i

and half a year in prison; the case ruined him. 2 He claimed
throughout to have followed the accepted customs of the trade.
The epigraph he gave to a published account of one of his trials
was 'Perish Commerce!' 3 Many, perhaps most, members of the
government and parliament agreed with him, and believed that
he had committed no offence whatsoever: the statutory penalties
against forestalling, regrating and engrossing had been repealed
in 1772.4 The judges, particularly Lord Kenyon, the Lord Chief
Justice, were emphatically of the opposite view. They had worked
hard to restate the offences at common law and were delighted
with the outcome of the trials.
Waddington's Cases, and the related prosecution of Rusby, were
notorious at the time, and almost incredible to nineteenth-century
commentators. Lord Campbell termed Kenyon's judgements an
'absurd doctrine' about an 'imaginary crime'. 5 More recently it
has been suggested that the cases not only contradicted government policy in 1800 and earlier, but also a current of legal doctrine
in the later eighteenth century that increasingly reflected many
of the principles of classical political economy. 6 After Kenyon's
death in 1802 further prosecutions for marketing offences were
quietly dropped; by 1816 the treatise writers declared that the
law, so loudly proclaimed by the judges and so dramatically
enforced at the expense of Mr Waddington, was dead.
In retrospect these cases appeared anomalous, but at the time
they expressed an unresolved tension in law and policy. Lord
Kertyon, who was Chief Justice of King's Bench from 1788 until
(n. 1 conr.;

related ones referred to below, and the sources in the records of King's Bench, see
Appendix. Samuel Ferrand Waddington should not be confused with Samuel
Waddington, 'little Waddy', radical printer and shoemaker: see Iain McCalman,
Radical Underworld: Prophets, Revolutionaries and Pornographers in London, 1795-1840
(London, 1988), 269, passim.
2 He retained Edward Law (whose fees were very high since his successful defence
of Warren Hastings) backed by seven other counsel; Law became Attorney General
three days after Waddington was sentenced. The prosecution in both cases was led
by Thomas Erskine, probably the most expensive barrister in England, backed by
another phalanx of juniors: see Dictionary of National Biography; Proceedings in the
Cause the King v. Waddington, 25.
3 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, title page.
4 12 Geo. III, c. 71.
5 John, Lord Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices, 3 vols. (1857; repr. London,
1971), iii, 138.
6 Roger Wells, Wretched Faces: Famine in Wartime England, 1793-1801 (Gloucester,
1988); also his Insurrection: The British Experience, 1795-1803 (Gloucester, 1983);
Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979).

1802, and at the time of the case was near the end of his long
legal career, was idiosyncratic in some of his enthusiasms, but his
view of the marketing offences was shared by most of the other
eleven common-law judges in 1801.7 Moreover, all standard legal
works throughout the eighteenth century emphasized that forestalling, regrating and engrossing were offences at common law,
even after the 1772 repeal. The judges' endorsement of that view
in 1801, followed by their repudiation of the doctrine within a
few years, was an important transition in public policy, with large
consequences. 8 The marketing cases, when examined closely, also
raise important questions about the place of the courts in the
anatomy of the state, and cast some light on the nature of contract
law in the late eighteenth century.
To inquire about the nature of a judiciary that is guaranteed
independence from royal disfavour at the beginning of the eighteenth century is to pose the question of the 'relative autonomy'
of law in a particular form. Not for the first time, but under new
conditions after the Act of Settlement (1701), we see the possibility of a judicial politics independent of, or indeed opposed to,
government policy, legislative intent or economic interest. Before
Waddington there was Lord Camden's role in the cases involving
Wilkes, when as Chief Justice of Common Pleas he opposed, in
almost every instance, the decisions and politics of Lord
Mansfield, who at the time sat both as Chief Justice of King's
Bench and in the cabinet. 9 In the nineteenth century we can cite
the long series of cases in which judicial ingenuity was constantly
exercised to block the willingness of Parliament to enact legislation designed to protect trade unions from the hostility of courts. 10
In such cases of judicial politics we need to know where 'oppositional' judges get their politics and projects, how they justify
their behaviour and how they manage to shape legal doctrine
7 Sydney Smith wrote in his old age: 'I remember when ten judges out of twelve
laid down this doctrine in their charges to the various grand juries on their circuits',
quoted in Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices, iii, 80. At Rusby's trial, Kenyon stated
that all the judges had charged their juries that the common-law offences still stood:
Times, 5 July 1800.
8 Such an explanation is needed not only for the evidently anomalous case; all
significant developments of doctrine, however linear, are accomplished only in
specific cases.
9 Douglas Hay, 'Contempt by Scandalizing the Court: A Political History of the
First Hundred Years', Osgoode Hall Law JI, xxv (Fall 1987).
10 The most recent account is John Orth, Combination and Conspiracy: A Legal
History of Trade Unionism, 1721-1906 (Oxford, 1991).

(sometimes surprisingly quickly) to such ends. We also need to
ask how the interests of government are affected, how it responds
and what are the consequences for accounts privileging a notion
of 'the state' closely identified with 'law'. Finally, we need to
examine the detailed evidence, in specific decisions such as these
cases, of the relations judges have with government, party and
wider publics. We can then say more exactly what we mean by
the notion of an independent judiciary, and by 'rule of law'. 11
The marketing cases have also figured in a debate of the last
twenty years concerning the nature of contract doctrine at the
end of the eighteenth century and the place within it of classical political economy. Patrick Atiyah cited these cases as two
instances of what he argued was a weakened but still extant
tradition in the courts of interfering in some contractual matters
in the interests of public policy, interference of a kind that became
anathema to nineteenth-century judges, who by then were purposive facilitators of the market, some more overtly than others.
Two questions are central. One is whether the eighteenth-century
judges were willing, in some instances, to refuse to enforce agreements, particularly contracts for future performance, solely on
the grounds that ab initio or through passage of time they were
seriously disadvantageous to the public interest, or to one party
in a way harmful to that interest. 12 The second point at issue is
the extent to which such judicial practices, if they existed, were
part of a world-view innocent of, or suspicious of, political economy, and were eventually ended by doctrinal changes inspired in
significant measure by political economy. 13
Atiyah's argument has been debated with evidence and argu11 An assessment of how the bench viewed political economy, or the relationship
of judicial to wider political power, cannot be based on a few cases. I am working on
a general argument for the period between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth
centuries, based on an examination of a variety of cases in public and private law,

The Judges and the People: King's Bench and the Criminal Law in English Politics and
Society, 1750-1820 (forthcoming).
12 The suggestion is that this took place in the common-law courts through the use
of jury verdicts, but also some elements of doctrine, and that similar views were
expressed in decisions in Chancery and the equity side of Exchequer.
13 The argument is a wide-ranging one, covering doctrines of promise and consideration, attitudes to quasi-contract (restitution), expectation damages, the likely behaviour of juries and the elaboration of doctrines of mistake, unconscionability and
reliance. Aliyah insists on the fact that he was describing tendencies in the law over
about a century, not a sudden revolution. Aliyah, Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract,
passim. The marketing cases are considered at 363-6, where the citation of Rushy as
'Ruby' copies a typographical error in some reports.

ments of varying worth and, given the wide ambit of contract
law, differing conclusions have been drawn about its relevance
to particular aspects of contract. 14 Waddington and Rushy,
although criminal cases, are indeed relevant to an extent not
evident in Atiyah's account. The detailed history of the litigation
(rather than the laconic law reports) shows that classical political
economy was actively debated in parliament, in the legal profession and on the bench by 1800.15 The wide reporting of cases in
Westminster Hall by this date, and the duration of litigation
there, made the central courts extremely important fora of that
debate. My conclusion is that the brief notoriety and swift repudiation of these cases brought a vulgarized notion of political economy before the bench, and a much wider public, and helped to
ensure its paramountcy in a few short decades. 16
The continuing popular significance of the medieval and early
14 There is now a wide literature on Atiyah's description of changes in contract law
and the somewhat different account of a wider range of private law of Morton
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law (London, 1977). A recent summary of
the main points at issue is John Wightman, Contract: A Critical Commentary (London,
1996), chs. 4, 5. See also Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence,
1760-1850 (Oxford, 1991), esp. ch. 9; on one important doctrinal issue presented as
a test of Atiyah's argument, with much interesting evidence, Michael Lobban,
'Contractual Fraud in Law and Equity, c.1750-1850', Oxford J I Legal Studies, xvii
(1997). Here, I think Lobban somewhat oversimplifies the debate about change, or
at least Atiyah's complex account of it, when he describes it as 'fairness or freedom
of contract' whether 'a communitarian and paternalistic approach was replaced by an
individualistic and entirely-market orientated ideology of freedom of contract'. His
own reading of the case law (in part) is that concern with 'fairness' actually increased
in the common-law courts in the early nineteenth century. The argument tends to
blur the fact that Atiyah described change largely as a contrast between 1770 and
1850; it is also confused by repeated references to Kenyon (who, indeed, was deeply
concerned with fairness) as an exemplar of judicial attitudes of the early nineteenth
century. Kenyon was an eighteenth-century judge in every sense of the word, including his dates (1732-1802). Many of his more adventurous attempts at fairness (not
only the marketing cases) were repudiated by his immediate successors.
15 Which is not to say that the public debate was very learned; the struggle was for
ideological conquest. Francis Horner in 1803 declined to publish a critique of Smith
because the victory of political economy was not yet complete. 'We owe much at
present to the superstitious worship of Smith's name . . . until we can give a correct
and precise theory of the nature and origin of wealth, his popular and plausible and
loose hypothesis is as good for the vulgar as any other', quoted in Biancamaria
Fontana, Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: The Edinburgh Review, 18021832 (Cambridge, 1985), 47.
16 Lobban in his critique of Atiyah argues against making 'too direct a link between
changes in economic thought and changes in judicial behaviour' in this period. As
evidence, he quotes John Stuart Mill (writing in 1825, at the age of nineteen) to the
effect that before 1818 political economy was 'scarcely known and talked of beyond
a small circle of philosophers'. Lobban further suggests that even after 1815 'the
economic policy of the government tended to be pragmatic rather than ideological'

(cont.

011

p. 106)

modern laws against forestalling, regrating and engrossing into
the eighteenth century was recovered in E. P. Thompson's seminal article on the moral economy of the English crowd of 1971.17
He showed the persistence of popular support for prosecutions
against middlemen, and the willingness of government at midcentury and many gentlemen and magistrates for decades after,
to condemn middlemen for enhancing prices, and hence effective
dearth, through the speculative practices stigmatized by the statute and case law. The traditionalist view was, above all, a matter
of law, a fact which must be emphasized because it has been
largely ignored in most discussions of moral economy since
Thompson wrote. The old statutes were repeatedly cited by
magistrates in charges to juries in London and in the country
throughout the first half of the century. Forestallers, it was said,
'render the Poor less able to support their families' (Middlesex,
1718). They were:
Pernicious Sorts of People; who Plot and Conspire together to Advance
unreasonably, or without any Real, Just Occasion the Price of Victuals,
to the great Oppression, and Breeding of Murmuring and Discontent,
especially amongst the lower and meaner Sort of People.
(Middlesex, 1725)

They were held to enhance prices to the 'common Prejudice of
all Buyers' (Barnsley, 1741), and the offenders were esteemed by
law 'great Offenders' (Guildford, 1745). A charge repeatedly used
in Norwich in the early 1750s grouped the marketing offences
( n. 16 cunt.;

and hence that 'if governments were not directly under the sway of economic theorists,
there is no reason to believe that judges should have been, particularly if (like Eldon
and Ellenborough), they were of High Tory persuasion'. See Lobban, 'Contractual
Fraud in Law and Equity', 442 nn. 7-8. The nature of argument in the marketing
cases suggests that all of these assertions (apart from the characterization of Eldon)
are untenable for the first decades of the nineteenth century; the law reports are
frequently misleading as to the nature of persuasive argument in court.
17 E. P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth
Century', Past and Present, no. 50 (Feb. 1971). He recapitulated the argument with
new evidence and a consideration of the ensuing debate, in 'The Moral Economy
Reviewed', in his Customs in Common (London, 1991). There was truly ancient law
on the matter: the Athenian constitution provided special officers of the state to detect
and punish engrossers and those who made more than the legal profit on corn. The
death penalty probably did not apply, but a member of the Athenian Council in a
speech in 386 BC demanded punishment for men making such 'illicit gain': 'pity those
of our citizens who perished by their villainy, and the traders against whom they
have combined': 'Against the Corndealers', ch. 22, in Lysias, trans. W. R. M. Lamb
(Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, s. 51 (trans. P. J. Rhodes, Harmondsworth, 1984). I owe these references to
Virginia Hunter.

with usury, monopoly, deceits and 'Cozinage in Weights and
measures by which in a more particular manner the poor & needy
are oppressd & mind for the emolument of some few of the most
Worthless of Mankind'. In September 1767, the citizens of the
city were again alerted from the bench to 'that cruel hardship on
the poor Usury Forestalling Monopoly & the like'. 18
The analysis of the political economists, that a wholly free
market happily rationed supplies over the harvest year, seemed
but abstract theory to traditionalists, contradicted by their own
knowledge of the happy and opportunistic responses of millers
and farmers to apprehended harvest failures. But the analysis of
the advantages of market rationing, given classic form by Adam
Smith in Book 4, Chapter 5 of The Wealth of Nations (1776),
began to influence even country magistrates after the repeal of
the statutes in 1772.19
The correctness of each theory in hindsight -whether speculative withholding (or 'market rationing') was harmful or beneficial, or even how the corn market worked in practice - is not
my concern here. 20 It is important, however, to emphasize that
the dichotomy of moral economy and political economy proposed
by Thompson was in fact an organizing principle of political and
legal debates to the end of the century. It is not a crudely
simplifying device that he imposed on the evidence. This last is
the suggestion of Hont and Ignatieff, who argue that there were,
by the 1770s, political-economy arguments for interfering as well
as not interfering in markets in times of real crisis, and that
'traditionalists' too were often simply taking a position within
political economy and were not, therefore, traditionalists in the
simple sense (they say) that Thompson makes them. 21 Smith's
18 These examples and others are reprinted in Charges to the Grand Jury, 1689-1803,
ed. Georges Lamoine (Camden Soc., 4th ser., xxxxiii, London, 1992), 73, 105, 126,
188, 203, 218, 235, 297, 313, 323, 360, 369, 373, 378, 382.
19 Sir John Hawkins mentioned the offences briefly in a charge of January 1770;
ten years later he ignored them. The Revd John Foley, a Gloucestershire paternalist,
eloquently defended the wisdom of the market in a series of charges at the end of
the century. Ibid., 425, 431, 583ff.; Adam Smith, 'Digression concerning the Corn
Trade and Corn Laws', IV. v. b, in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, ed. W. B. Todd, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1976), i, 524-43.
20 Some of the extensive comment on Thompson's article has concerned this issue,
including the argument that markets are not efficient allocators in circumstances of
real or apprehended famine.
21 Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, 'Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations:
An Introductory Essay', in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and
Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge,
1983), 15.

commitment to a wholly unrestricted trade in corn, both internally
and externally, is, they argue, atypical even among the bestknown theorists of the free market by 1776, as a result of direct
experience by such theorists with the felt suffering and problems
for governments of shortages in both Europe and Britain in the
1760s and early 1770s. Faced with starvation, they drew back
from dogmatic certitude.22 (And even Smith, perhaps, would
have admitted government regulation in the face of absolute
starvation. )23
This is a useful elucidation of published political economy, but
it captures only a narrow band of contemporary opinion. Even
among educated men the traditionalist view very often arose from
premises quite unrelated to any discussion of the rationality of
self-regulating markets. Conversely, those supporting such theories in England (notably Edmund Burke) had, by the 1770s and
even more by the end of the century, no hesitation in drawing
the fullest, un-nuanced, conclusions from Adam Smith.
However, traditionalists and political economists were both
acutely aware that the marketing offences were, after all, issues
of law. A reading of their social significance, of their meaning
and their rationales, therefore, was ultimately, and crucially,
dependent on the views of the legislature and even more of the
judges of the Court of King's Bench when they came to consider,
alter or uphold the law. What follows is in large measure an
attempt to reconstruct the mind of the bench in 1800. But it is
helpful to look briefly at the preceding half-century. 24
Kenyon was caricatured in 1800 as an old man who could not
understand new ideas. In fact, he was voicing an important contemporary strand of educated opinion. Those supporting criminal
Ibid., 17-19.
Smith did say that to hinder the freedom of the farmer seeking the best market
was 'an act of legislative authority which ought to be exercised only, which can be
pardoned only in cases of the most urgent necessity': Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV.
v. b. 39 (ed. Todd, i, 539), cited by Hont and lgnatieff, 'Needs and Justice in the
Wealth of Nations' , 20-1. They point out that a comparison with the position of Hume
on dearth and markets suggests that by 'urgent necessity' Smith appears to mean only
impending starvation. Smith also admitted the possible role of fraud in corn markets,
as close readers pointed out: see Edmund Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity,
22

23

Originally Presented

to

the Right Hon. William Pitt, in the Month of November, 1795

(London, 1800); also below, n. 98.
24 The evidence and sources for the following three paragraphs appear in Douglas
Hay, 'Moral Economy, Political Economy, and Law', in Adrian Randall and Andrew
Charlesworth (eds.), The Moral Economy: Crowds, Conflict and Authority (London,
1998), a few paragraphs of which also appear in this article.

penalties for speculating in foodstuffs could cite the findings of
parliamentary committees of 1764, 1766, 1768 and 1796 that one
or more of the offences of forestalling, regrating and engrossing
had recently and artificially enhanced prices to the detriment of
the public. Parliament received petitions to this effect in most
decades and bills for new penal legislation were attempted or
actually brought before parliament in 1766, 1787 and 1797. An
important source for some initiatives was the Common Council
of London, largely reacting to the forestalling of its market of
Smithfield. In part, their interest in legislation was initiated by
retail butchers warring with wholesalers, but the recurrent controversy helped sustain support for all the old criminal law against
market offenders, and city aldermen, as MPs, introduced some
of the bills for new legislation. 25
On the other side were the supporters of Adam Smith. Smith's
classic exposition of free markets in the corn trade was published
in 1776, but the theoretical and practical case against the marketing laws was effectively made before that date in public lectures,
parliament and the courts. A 1767 attempt to repeal the statutes
came to nothing, but Edmund Burke, who had been involved,
successfully achieved the passage in a few weeks' time in 1772 of
an act that repealed all or part of six of the most important ones,
and voided all current and future prosecutions on them.26 The
explicit justification was that such prosecutions increased prices,
distorted markets, harmed the poor and threatened to interfere
with the supply of foodstuffs to London. Burke successfully
opposed the 1787 attempt to re-introduce criminal penalties by
statute and was eloquent in condemning similar proposals in 1795
to interfere with 'the laws of commerce, which are the laws of
nature, and consequently the laws of God'.27 He lived just long
25 Susan Brown understates the importance of the dispute in the meat-trade controversy. She makes the suggestive point, however, that expectations of civic paternalism,
protecting the poor from market excesses, were probably more effective in the
intimate setting of the City than in the rest of London. Susan E. Brown, ' "A Just
and Profitable Commerce": Moral Economy and the Middle Classes in EighteenthCentury London', JI Brit. Studies, xxxii (1993).
26 An Act for Repealing Several Laws therein M entioned against Badgers, Engrossers,
Forestallers, and Regrators, and for Indemnifying Persons against Prosecutions for Offences
Committed against the Said Acts: 12 Geo. III, c. 71 (1772). For the public presentation
of Smith's ideas from the 1750s, see Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith

(Oxford, 1995), 107-8; for David Hume's championing of free markets in corn in
1758, see TLS, 14 Aug. 1998.
27 Hay, 'Moral Economy, Political Economy, and Law'; Burke, Thoughts and Details
on Scarcity, 32.

enough to see the 1797 restoring bill (which horrified him)
defeated.
Burke's position was also that of Lord Mansfield, the Chief
Justice of King's Bench from 1756 to 1788, the judge who (with
his three puisne justices) ultimately decided what was criminal in
England. He may have been involved in planning the 1772 legislation and, after its passage, apparently deterred any prosecutions
in his court under the common law.28 Prosecutions at quarter
sessions and assizes, which had been a recurrent if infrequent
occurrence in most parts of the country before 1772, appear to
have virtually ceased also at that time. But the exact state of the
law was uncertain. Did the offences still exist at common law, in
spite of the repeal of some of the statutes? Summaries of the old
criminal law on marketing offences were republished in London
in 1750, 1765, and at the end of the century. The leading legal
treatises and abridgements on criminal and general law (Hawkins,
1716, 1795; Bacon, 1778) approved its policy and (more importantly), between 1754 and 1810 every one of the twenty-one
editions of the leading guide for magistrates, Richard Bum's
Justice of the Peace, reiterated that the marketing offences were
still offences at common law. Traditionalists quoted one of the
most famous judges of all: 'A Forestaller is called by my Lord
Coke, Pauperum Depressor & totius Communitatis & Patriae publicus inimicus (a Depressor of the Poor, and a publick Enemy of

the whole Community and to his Country), and therefore is
punishable at Common Law'.29 This was the law as magistrates
understood it should be. But Mansfield apparently believed that
with the repeal of the statutes, the common-law offences also had
perished. And he made the law: the bar probably believed that
in any case brought before him, he would require proof both of
criminal intent to raise prices and that such had been the result.
As a follower of Adam Smith, he was unlikely to find any evidence
that met both those tests. What must be emphasized, however,
is that by the end of the century, the issue was not yet resolved,
either in the courts (there was no recent fully argued precedent)
28

For some of Mansfield's early connections with Smith, see Ross, Life of Adam

Smith, 132, 158.
29 W. Nelson, The Office and Authority of a Justice of Peace, 2 vols. (London, 1745),
i, 404, and subsequent editions, quoting Coke ( pt 3, ch. 89) on forestallers: for the
last edition of Coke before Waddington's case, see Sir Edward Coke, The Third Part
of the Institutes of the Laws of England, (London, 1797), 196. Coke in fact was quoting
from a statute of Edward I.

or in parliament . When prices rose, the public demanded enforcement. A year after Mansfield retired from the bench, the Times
protested:
It is equally surprising and unaccountable that all the wisdom and humanity of our Ministers and Magistracy in England will not put an end to
monopolies -forestalling markets, and keeping up the prices of all the
necessaries of life to such an exorbitant pitch as they are at present. It is
owing to this shocking Police, and cruel inattention to the poor, that our
prisons are filled with insolvent debtors, our streets with beggars and
pickpocket s, our highways with robbers and footpads, and thousands of
indigent people of industry, with families, are literally starving. 30

The crises of 1795 and 1800-1 (the worst dearth of the century)
made resolution imperative. Abstaining from legal interference
with the markets, where there were acknowledged to be widespread practices of resale and buying outside the market, was the
position of those who controlled parliamentary majorities:
William Pitt, the duke of Portland (the Home Secretary), William
Wyndham Grenville (who argued that 'the best way would be to
leave the grain to find its own value') and the duke of Richmond.31
It was that of the leaders of the opposition (both Charles James
Fox32 and his nephew, the third Lord Holland, supported Pitt's
approach to the dearth); it was also, significantly, that of some
Jacobin supporters of revolutionary change.33
There were traditionalists, however , even in cabinet. In
September 1800, Lord Liverpool, president of the Board of
Trade, received letters from Sir Joseph Banks and others blaming
middlemen for the sufferings of the poor. Banks sympathized
with the 'honest' rioting miners in his neighbourhood (he had
unsuccessfull y tried to divert them with a prosecution of a baker
and a forestaller) and argued that 'Smith's Principles [are] like
those of the French Revolution breathing nothing but unqualified
30

Times, 21 Oct. 1789.

Grenville and Pitt read Wealth of Nat ions together in the 1780s and convinced
themselves of its arguments: J. S. Girdler, Observations on the Pernicious Consequences
of Foresta/ling, Regrating, and Engrossing (London, 1800), 58; Peter Jupp, Lord
Grenville, 1759-1834 (Oxford, 1985), 47-8; Richmond to Portland, 25 Sept. 1800:
Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), HO 42/51, fos. 455-7.
32 'I have talked with Fox, who thinks all this is visionary (taught, I suppose, in
other days by Burke)': 'Erskine to Kenyon, London, 15 Oct. 1800', in George T.
Kenyon, The Life of Lloyd, First Lord Kenyon, Lord Chief Justice of England (London,
1873), 373. In the debate on high prices in November 1795, Fox said he 'differed
materially in no point' from Pitt, a point noted at Waddington's trial in Worcester:
Berrow's Worcester J I, 31 July 1800; Wells, Wretched Faces, 234-5.
33 Henry Richard, Lord Holland, M emoirs of the Whig Party during my Time, ed.
Henry Edward, Lord Holland, 2 vols. (London, 1852), i, 166-9.
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liberty and are as little founded in reason & experience as the
French are however specious they may appear to be'. Liverpool
agreed there were conspiracies in the corn trade, which should
not enjoy the freedom accorded other commerce. 'I do not mean
to say', he wrote Banks, 'that our ancestors may not have carried
these principles too far; but, I think, our modern Oeconomists
have carried their principles to as great a degree of extravagance'.
Smith 'pushed his principles to an extravagant length, and, in
some respects, has erred . . . These principles are the favourites
of all speculative men, who are averse to resort to the dull detail
of facts'. Banks for his part sent Liverpool a memorandum on
the ancient law, arguing that forestallers were more active than
they had been for 500 years. He recommended fines, pillory,
prison and banishment, although not the baiting by dogs and
whipping out of town he found in a statute of Edward I: 'Such
a succession of punishment would I am convinced tame even Mr.
Waddington, if it is necessary to resort to a new enactment of
these well considered laws'. Liverpool made some attempt to
persuade his colleagues, including Henry Dundas and Portland,
that practical experience called Smith's speculations into question,
but apparently with no success; he abandoned the argument in
October. 34
Similar attachment to the old law could be found in parliament
and the Common Council of London, as the attempts at legislation
in the 1780s and 1790s show. Thus Sir Richard Hill, whom
Kenyon held in esteem, wrote William Wilberforce in December
1800, 'we are combatting imaginary famine in the midst of real
plenty':
I am indeed sory to see that the novel maxims of one scotchman, should
be the rule of practice in all England and that the greatest men in the
nation are kissing the toe of Pope Adam Smith. I heartily wish that The
Wealth of Nations may not contribute to make ours poor, by introducing

34 A. Morris to Liverpool, 9 July 1800: British Library, London (hereafter Brit.
Lib.), Add. MSS 38,234, fo. 100; also in the same volume of manuscripts, see Sir
Joseph Banks to Liverpool, 3, 9, 16, 28, 29 Sept. 1800 (fos. 138ff., 140, 152, 164,
166, 170); Richard George Robinson to Liverpool, Lichfield, [autumn] 1800 (fo. 170);
P. D. Parquot to Liverpool, Warrington, 4 Nov. 1800 (fo. 228). See Liverpool to
Sheffield, 30 July 1800: Brit. Lib., Add. MSS 38,311, fo. 68; also his letters to Henry
Dundas, 15 Aug., 11 Oct. 1800 (fos. 65v, 83v); to John Kilshaw, 23 Sept. 1800 (fo.
75v); to Sir Joseph Banks, 25 Sept. 1800 (fo. 75); to Portland, 9 Oct. 1800 (fo. 79v).
See also Wells, Wretched Faces, 65, 86-8, 197-8, 243-4.

opinions which strongly militated against the well being of the
middle class of individuals, as well as against the more indigent. 35

Hill and those like him were delighted when it became clear that
Kenyon, who had succeeded Mansfield as Lord Chief Justice,
would not kiss Smith's toe.
II
THE LAW IN THE HANDS OF LORD KENYON

In 1795, Kenyon announced on the summer assize circuit that
forestalling was still indictable at common law, a reaffirmation of
what was undoubtedly to be found in Coke and Hawkins and
Burn, but a significant statement because it gave notice that if
Mansfield had been hostile to the doctrine, Kenyon was not. His
charge to the grand jury in his own county of Shropshire was
reprinted in many provincial newspapers:
Gentlemen, since I have been in this place, a report has been handed to
me, without any foundation I sincerely hope, that a set of private individuals are plundering at the expence of public happiness, by endeavouring
in this county, to purchase the grain now growing upon the soil! -For
the sake of common humanity, I trust it is untrue: Gentlemen, you ought
to be the champions against this hydra-headed monster. It is your duty,
as Justices, to see justice done to the country! In your respective districts,
as watchmen, be on your guard.

He warned that anyone convicted before him would feel 'the full
vengeance of the law . . . Neither purse, nor person, shall prevent
it'. The grand jury in Shrewsbury immediately resolved that they
would use all their powers against such illegal contracts and would
punish any undermining of traditional market practices. In
35 Sir Richard Hill to William Wilberforce, 9 Dec. 1800: Bodleian Library, Oxford,
Wilberforce MSS, c.3, fo. 51. Wilberforce himself remarked on the 'callousness, the
narrow and foolish wisdom of servilely acquiescing in Adam Smith's general principles,
without allowance for a thousand circumstances which take the case out of the
province of that very general principle'. He wrote to Kenyon after Waddington's
second conviction, but before sentencing: 'I feel deeply for the poor, I must say that
it is trifling with them to announce that there is a sufficiency of food, unless it be at
a price which is within their powers of payment'. He suggested that a maximum
price (which Kenyon alluded to at trial) was desirable but not possible. A passage
assuring the Chief Justice that any correspondence would remain confidential, and
the passage quoted above, are not reprinted in the transcription: 'William Wilberforce
to Kenyon, "near London'', 9 Jan. 1801', in HM C Kenyon, 555 no. 1419; Kenyon
MSS, HMC 1419, Gredington. I am very grateful to the Rt Hon. Lord Kenyon, DL,
for his extremely helpful assistance and for permission to quote from his papers at
Gredington.

November Mr Justice Ashhurst gave a similar charge in
Middlesex. 36
Even before the crisis of 1795, the Chief Justice's view of the
law appears to have encouraged other traditionalists who shared
it. In Staffordshire, the grand jury apparently considered (but
rejected) instituting public prosecutions of forestallers and
engrossers in 1793, following assizes held before Kenyon and
Nash Grose, the other King's Bench judge who was to be most
active in Waddington's case.37 The first prosecutions in the county
since 1766 took place at Translation and Michaelmas quarter
sessions of 1795, following an order of the magistrates that the
Clerk of the Peace prosecute at the public expense. 38 In
Wolverhampton the constables took several regrators to court,
and this pattern of public enforcement is found in other counties. 39 In July 1795, the Birmingham High Bailiff announced that
all forestallers, and those who sold to them, would be prosecuted.
Within months an association of 'many respectable Inhabitants',
advertised repeatedly that they would pay for prosecutions and
appoint detectives in the markets, in order to end 'these enormous
abuses' and 'shameful practices'; they promised to publish the
names of offenders and to reward citizens informing against such
'pests of society'.40 Oxford City Council instructed the city solicitor to prosecute all offenders dealing in corn, grain or flour and
36 Shrewsbury Chron., 7 Aug. 1795; Berrow's Worcester J I, 13 Aug. 1795, quoted in
Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 298, who misdates it 1796; The Correspondence
of Edmund Burke, ed. George H. Gutteridge, 10 vols. (Chicago, 1961), viii, 344. The
offence of purchasing growing grain was considered a species of forestalling, according
to a statement of Coke's quoted in most justices' manuals. On the timing of Kenyon's
decision to emphasize the common law, see pt iv below.
37 Staffordshire Record Office, Stafford (hereafter SRO), Q!SB, Michaelmas 1793,
document 175, resolution of 10 October 1793 that the Clerk of the Peace prosecute
any who 'forestalled or engrossed any market in the said county by buying up
provisions before they are brought into open market'. The resolution is struck through
and no such order appears in the Order Books.
38 When Thomas Smallwood wrote to report a farmer, Robert Glover, for buying
300 strike of barley, John Sparrow JP alluded to the repeal of the statutes against
forestalling and suggested that only if Glover sold again in a distant market would it
be an offence; he asked the clerk to give Smallwood a fuller answer: Thomas
Smallwood to John Sparrow, Betley, 12 Sept. 1795: SRO, Q!SB, Michaelmas 1795,
pt l; also memorandum of Sparrow, 26 Sept. 1795.
39 SRO, Q!SB, Michaelmas 1795, recommendation that John Salt be appointed clerk
of Wolverhampton market. Reeves, Povey, Welch and Ward were all fined ls. and
costs at Staffordshire sessions on promising not to offend again; Welch (who had
regrated lamb) was also imprisoned for four days: Aris' Birmingham Gaz., 12 Oct.
1795.
40 Aris' Birmingham Gaz., 6 July, 7, 14, 28 Sept., 12 Oct. 1795.

offered a twenty-guinea reward .41 The following spring the city
of Winchester offered twenty guineas in reward for information
leading to convictions; there are many other examples. 42
The prosecutions that took place in 1795-6, and the more
numerous ones of 1800-1, were in part stimulated by the activities
of a number of traditionalist country gentlemen, including Joseph
Girdler of Maidenhead (Kent), who first offered rewards for
convictions of forestallers, regrators and engrossers in the provincial papers in 1795. He spread the gospel through letters and
handbills from the beginning of 1796, with some success; he was
threatened with death as a result. He credited to his efforts a
number of successful prosecutions and also a lawsuit, instigated
in Common Pleas by the City of London, in which the plaintiff
got a verdict and damages for regrating. 43 But Girdler's activities,
and those of others now using the courts, meant that the old
common-law doctrine would be thoroughly considered in litigation at a time when the supporters of political economy were also
intent on victory.
The dearth of 1795-6 generated, as we have seen, highly
charged attacks on Kenyon's doctrine, notably Burke's denunciation of any interference with market forces. The prosecutions
in 1795-6 at the behest of local government remained at that
level; parliament and Pitt, having rejected the notion of restoring
some statute law on the marketing offences a decade before, did
so again in 1797.44 By 1800, even some traditionalists were beginning to wonder whether the old doctrine was defensible. In April
1796 a wealthy Bedfordshire farmer, Thomas Battams, had
pleaded guilty at Buckingham sessions to regrating fourteen quarters of oats at a profit of 6d. a quarter. The chairman, the marquis
of Buckingham, had had Battams watched by two magistrates in
order to get the evidence to convict him, and the prosecution
was by a county subscription. At the sessions Buckingham warmly
denounced the crime and a very large bench of justices sentenced
Battams to fourteen days in gaol and a fine of £200. Some of the
press commented that the law 'throws a man entirely on the
41 Oxford Council Aas, 1752-1801, ed. M. G. Hobson (Oxford, 1962), 233 (8 July
1795). This was two weeks before Kenyon sat there at the summer assizes noted
below. For the harvest crisis in 1795, see Wells, Wretched Faces, 84-5, pa ssim.
42 Hampshire Chron., 23 Apr. 1796. I have not made a systematic search of the
local press.
43 Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 209-15, 288, 295-7.
44 On 1797, see Hay, 'Moral Economy, Political Economy, and Law'.

mercy of the Justices' and that 'no respectability of character can
screen the offender from severe punishment'. 45 At the time
Buckingham thought the consequence was a salutary fall in prices
and had no doubts about the value of the prosecution. But four
years later, in 1800, he noted, 'as I have frequently been obliged
to argue with some whose opinions have great weight with me,
and who doubted not only the policy, but the law of our proceedings in that case, I have paused upon one or two opportunities
of making similar examples'. To settle those doubts, he wrote to
Lord Kenyon for reassurance that the offence was indeed punishable at common law.46
In short, if the common law was to continue to be put into
effect, Kenyon and his brother judges needed to do two things:
establish a modern authoritative precedent by a judgement after
full argument by counsel; and encourage prosecutions through
the most public discussion of the grounds of that judgement. By
the time that Buckingham wrote, as corn prices mounted to
vertiginous heights, Kenyon and several of the other eleven
common-law judges had been busy for some months working to
those ends.
The judges knew by January 1800 that three cases were likely
to come before them. Two were indictments of John Rusby, a
prosperous factor in the Corn Exchange in Marks Lane, who was
prosecuted at the City of London Sessions in late 1799 for regrating and engrossing .47 The prosecutor chose to have the indict45 Northampton M ercury, 23 Apr. 1796; Berrow's Worcester J I, 28 Apr. 1796;
Shrewsbury Chron., 29 Apr. 1796; Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 215, later

noted that a similar prosecution in Oxfordshire resulted in only a 5s. fine.
46 Buckingham was probably referring to William Wyndham Grenville, Lord
Grenville, his younger brother, who was a convinced follower of Adam Smith: Jupp,
Lord Grenville; Buckingham to Kenyon, Stowe, 8 July 1800: Kenyon MSS, box 23;
Kenyon, L ife of Kenyon, 374-6; Girdler, Observations on Forestalling , 214, 296.
47 At trial Kenyon remarked that he was not aware of the case coming on, but he
probably meant that he was unsure of the exact date: Trial of J ohn Rushy in the Court
of K ing's Bench, Guildhall, London (London, 1800), 7. The first indictment charged
Rushy with engrossing 90 quarters of wheat to sell the same day, with three additional
counts for doing so by contracting, and with the intention to sell at 'excessive and
unreasonable rates and prices' . The second indictment was for buying 90 quarters of
oats at 4ls. per quarter and regrating by selling 30 quarters in the same market on
the same day for 43s. per quarter, in eight counts slightly varying one from another.
The prosecutor of both was Richard Snell and the indictments appear to have been
drawn very carefully. See Appendix. There is an abstract of the Trial of John Rushy,
in Girdler, Observations on For estalling , 231-60; another report was published as The
Trial at Large of John Rushy, Corn-Factor, f or Regrating Corn (London, 1800).

ments removed on writ of certiorari into King's Bench. 48 The
indictments arrived there at the beginning of Hilary term, in
January 1800, but many months might elapse before they could
yield a satisfactory precedent and such a prosecution might well
be dropped or compounded before that happened. 49 Kenyon and
his brother judges were therefore almost certainly delighted by
the prosecution of Waddington, begun before them directly in
January 1800.
Between 22 January and 5 February, Kenyon, Grose, Simon
LeBlanc and Soulden Lawrence, the four judges of King's Bench,
supervised the taking of affidavits at the Guildhall, in chambers
and even at Kenyon's home. Witnesses from Kent swore that
Waddington had bought large quantities of hops and announced
his intention of creating a scarcity in the market by investing
some £80,000. 50 In short, both act and intent were likely to be
made out at trial. The prosecution was brought by the hopfactors allied with the London brewers, who deeply resented
Waddington (who had only entered the trade in 1798) for trying
to manipulate a market that they ordinarily sought to control.
The growers needed credit until the crop was sold, but
Waddington subverted the brewers' hold over them by extending
credit himself, establishing a bank as part of his strategy. The
brewers and London factors were therefore unlikely to spare
expense, or drop the prosecution; it appears that one of the
prosecuting counsel was a partner in one of the main hop-factors'
houses. 51 Moreover, the prosecution was mounted in the most
dramatic, expensive and speedy manner possible, through a crim48 A possible motive would be to help establish a precedent by bringing the case
eventually before the justices of King's Bench, but it is also possible that the intention
was simply to make the prosecution oppressively expensive for the defendant: see D.
Hay, Crown Side Cases in the Court of King's Bench (Staffs. Hist. Soc., forthcoming).
49 The usual course would be for the charges to be sent for trial at the next sitting
of nisi prius in the jurisdiction from which they arose, but there could be delays. In
Rusby's case the trial, because the issue arose in the City of London, was before a
justice of King's Bench, and in fact Kenyon heard the case in July 1800 (see below).
But a precedent binding upon all other courts could only be established certainly
after arguments on a motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgement, if the defendant
made such motions, as the court doubtless expected Rushy to do. He did, and the
arguments on the motions did not take place until late November 1800 (Appendix).
so PRO, KB 1130, Hilary 1800, no. 48, deposition of Thomas Knipe, sworn at
Kenyon's house, Lincoln's Inn Fields, 22 Jan. 1800.
51 Peter Mathias, The Brewing Industry in England, 1700-1830 (Cambridge, 1959),
517-19; S. F. Waddington, An Appeal to the British Hop-Planters (London, 1800),
11, 20, 28, passim.

inal information in King's Bench. 52 A criminal information
involved many stages of process, all of which were exploited in
the proceedings against Waddington, with the advantage for
Kenyon and his brother judges that the state of the law began to
be argued in open court months before Rusby's case was heard
on 4 July. 53 By then, Waddington's case had been the subject of
widely reported arguments on seven occasions in February, May,
June and early July.
Thus, on 8 February, Kenyon and Grose welcomed Erskine's
application for an information against Waddington for the Kent
offence, granting a rule nisi for more than one information, since
Erskine mentioned offences in more than one county. Erskine,
prosecuting, said it was 'a Misdemeanour . . . which, I believe,
is much oftener practised than punished: and I am not very sure
that in my time any similar application has been made to the
Court'. He used the main arguments reiterated or adapted in the
months to come, quoting Lord Coke's remark that forestallers
ought to be ostracized as oppressors of the poor and enemies of
the community, describing Waddington and his agents as 'locusts'
who had in their 'talons' the entire crop. He concluded: 'The
subject is of immense moment'. The Lord Chief Justice echoed
immediately: 'It is of immense moment'. Both were aware that
this case would probably be the best one to determine the state
of the law. 54
While the lawyers prepared for the next stage of argument in
the cases, the judges went on circuit to clear the county gaols and
hear civil causes at nisi prius. Mr Justice Grose of King's Bench
had already charged the two Middlesex Grand Juries on
5 February that forestalling, regrating and engrossing were still
52 Such charges could be laid only when the judges considered the offence a grave
misdemeanour of public importance; presumably prosecuting counsel knew enough
of Kenyon's views to be sure of success. The only faster way would have been an
information ex officio by the Attorney General. It is clear that the government would
not have agreed to such a prosecution.
53 Motion for a rule granting the information, based on the affidavits and on oral
argument by counsel, followed by trial in King's Bench or in the county of the offence
and then judgement and sentence in King's Bench, with ample opportunities for
arguments for a change of venue or (on conviction) for motions for a new trial or in
arrest of judgement (Appendix).
54 Times, 10 Feb. 1800; Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 8-10. They
were probably also not unaware that Waddington, for reasons discussed below, would
be a particularly appropriate sacrifice to justice. On the arguments used in the case
on this and other occasions, see below. Erskine argued his first case in King's Bench
in 1778.

offences at common law, quite contrary to the common belief
that the 1772 statute had ended the offence: he read aloud from
Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown to prove it.ss At spring assizes the
same message was taken to the country. In Northumberland (and
presumably other counties), Robert Graham, recently appointed
to the Exchequer bench, deplored the repeal of the statutes, and
anticipated the outcome of Rusby and Waddington, urging his
grand jurors to fight the evil of market malpractice 'which, he
felt much gratified in perceiving, was now beginning to be viewed
in its proper light, and would soon, he hoped, be done away, to
the great and lasting benefit of the community at large'. At the
Norwich assizes, another Baron of the Exchequer, Beaumont
Hotham, charged his grand jurors on forestallers, concluding that
'those who dragged forth those pests of society, and brought
them to justice, deserved the commendation of every part of the
community'. On 21 June, Grose again reminded the Middlesex
grand juries in King's Bench that the offences incurred heavy
penalties at common law. His charge too amounted to an invitation to prosecute. s6
Meanwhile Waddington made his own case worse. While the
judges were exhorting grand juries at assizes, he went to
Worcester, the most important hop-growing region after Kent.
With the Kent charge due to be first argued in King's Bench on
5 May,s7 he openly encouraged the hop-growers and dealers at
Worcester to hold out against the London factors for higher
prices, claimed that the prosecution against him had been dropped
and entered into forehand contracts with a number of growers
for progressively higher prices. When the new term opened in
King's Bench, the prosecution supplied new affidavits on which
Erskine obtained, in the following term, a second criminal
information against Waddington for his effrontery in Worcester .
Both the prosecution and Kenyon must have been delighted.
The city of Worcester had its own assizes and the jury there was
likely to contain consumers disturbed by high food prices rather
than by hop-growers hoping for a rise in the market, which was

Times, 5, 10 Feb. 1800.
Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 336-7; Times, 24 June 1800.
57 Argument for a rule absolute. Waddington did not defend the charge at this
point , because he believed the court was sure to rule against him : Summary of the
Trial, 6. His intention was probably to try for an acquittal at trial.
55

56

the case in Kent, where a county jury would hear the case.58 And
the times were ripe for such a conviction: food prices had continued to rise, to reach the first of two unexampled peaks at just
this juncture. This first hearing on the Worcester offence on
16 May also allowed Erskine, for the prosecution, and Kenyon,
from the bench, to prepare the minds of any jurors who read the
newspapers. Erskine declared: 'I pray your Lordships for a
moment to suppose, that I am not speaking of hops, but of corn,
and then see how easy it is to apply what is done in one instance,
to another, and then say, what is to become of the people of this
country?'59 In turn, Kenyon, at this early stage of the proceedings,
made clear his opinion of Adam Smith:
It is said, that people have no more reason to fear forestalling, engrossing,
and regrating, than they have to fear witchcraft. It is easy for a man to
write a treatise in his closet; but if he would go to the distance of 200
miles from London, and were to observe people at every avenue of a
country town, buying up butter, cheese, and all the necessaries of life they
can lay hold of, in order to prevent them from coming to market (which
has happened to my knowledge), he would find, that this is something
more real, and substantial, than the crime of witchcraft. The country
suffers most grievously by it.60

Finally, Waddington again assisted his opponents. Erskine
came to court with the news that Waddington had dared to
publish a pamphlet in which he attacked the Kent criminal
information as a lettre de cachet, derided the sworn testimony,
defended his actions at length as an attack on monopoly and told
the hop-growers that they were the real defendants. He had also
published an appeal to the Kent hop-growers in the county
newspaper. King's Bench immediately granted Erskine a rule to
remove the trial from Kent, where jurors' minds might be influenced, to Middlesex. The trial therefore would take place in
King's Bench itself, before Kenyon, with a London special jury.
Even if the Worcester jury acquitted, or Rusby's case failed,
there was now an excellent chance for a conviction of
Waddington. The pre-trial strategy of the prosecution was
complete. 61
58 In April, the mayor and magistrates of Worcester advertised their determination
to punish offenders against the marketing laws: Berrow's Worcester JI, 10 Apr. 1800.
59 Summary of the Trial, 3.
60 Ibid., 5-6, emphasis in the original. For the comparison to witchcraft, see Smith,
Wealth of Nations, IV. v. b.26 (ed. Todd, i, 534).
61 Waddington, Appeal to the British Hop-Planters; Kentish Chron., 22 May 1800.
The Appeal is dated 10 March (37). Law, for Waddington, argued that there was no

(cont. on p. 121)

They were also successful at trial. Rusby was convicted in
London on 4 July of regrating, before a crowded court in a trial
lasting all day. On the 29 July Waddington was convicted in
Worcester of forestalling, after a trial lasting from 8 a.m. to 8
p.m.: the guilty verdict was greeted with cheers by the crowd. 62
The London jury found him guilty again on 8 December for his
activities in Kent. All three verdicts were subsequently questioned
in further proceedings, in motions for new trials or in arrest of
judgement, but the judges were anxious to assert from the
moment of the first verdicts that the law had been established.
Kenyon, congratulating Rusby's jurors, declared: 'Gentlemen, a
precedent made in a Court of Justice that will stem the torrent
of such affliction to the poor, is certainly useful to the public';
and Mr Justice Grose, passing sentence on Waddington, remarked
on 'the present moment, when a precedent is so peculiarly called
for, which may operate as an example to others upon a subject
which so materially concerns the Public'. 63 How these verdicts
(and the judgements based on them) were constructed and
defended is illuminating. Technical points of law, broad public
policy and the new science of political economy were all cited by
the lawyers and the judges. They were not of equal importance.
Technical law does not, in fact, seem to have carried much
weight with either side, for it was inconclusive. There were the
common legal quibbles that earlier cases had been badly reported
or had become irrelevant in the light of later statutes and cases.
The defence argued that the preamble of the 1772 repealing
statute showed parliament's intention to end all such prosecutions,
that Coke himself had enforced forehand bargains, and that the
most recent leading cases for the common law offences were 200
years old. The prosecution countered that the statute law had
interfered with the (superior) common law, hence the repeal.
( n. 61 cont. '

precedent for moving the case to King's Bench: it should have gone to an adjoining
county assizes. Neither the prosecution nor the judges replied to this point.
62 Annual Register (1800), ii, 25; Times, 4 Aug. 1800; Brit. Gaz., 3 Aug. 1800. On
12 July, two Newport butchers were convicted at Clerkenwell sessions of forestalling
Smithfield; the press reported that the sentences were only fines of £20 and three
months imprisonment, 'being the first examples since these sort of prosecutions fell
into disuse': Morning Chron., 14 July 1800.
63 Trial of John Rushy, 37; Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 260; Trial against
Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 189. Grose's use of the word 'precedent' appears also in
Times, 29 Jan. 1801, although the law report gives 'punishment' (1 East 166; 102
ER 65).

Kenyon simply cited Coke's damning words against profiteers
and held that the statute of Edward VI was declaratory of the
common law as it had stood from Saxon times. 64 The defence
cited a decision of 1631 to prove that hops were not a victual;
the prosecution countered that they had become such because
beer was now essential to sailors at war, hence to national
defence!65 Erskine eventually moved to the position that the
marketing offences could be committed with any commodity, not
just foodstuffs. 66 When the defence tried to show that the old
cases involved only actual monopoly, the prosecution (and
Kenyon) simply ignored the argument.
Important issues of actual harm and criminal intent, and the
origins of the prosecutions, were also raised, and also ignored by
the bench. The defence argued that no actual harm was proven,
that it had not been clearly shown that Waddington raised the
price and that, in any case, an intent to do what is not a crime,
is not a crime. Erskine merely reiterated that to use any device
to raise the price of any commodity was an offence; the intent,
in any case, was clear. These issues of harm and intent, largely
ignored by the judges in 1801, were to become very important
within a few years. The argument about the origin of the prosecution arose because criminal informations could only be granted
to prosecutors who came with 'clean hands'. Waddington and his
counsel knew who they were: London brewers and hop-factors,
who constantly made similar contracts, but who resented
Waddington's attempt to contest their control of the planters
through their own price-fixing and credit arrangements. The
problem for the defence was that the identity of the prosecutors
was not a matter of record and was not raised early enough in
the case. All references to their identity and activities had to be
ironic, allusive or indirect, and could not be made in open argu64 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 2-3, 8-9, 61, 64, 66-7, 69, 74;
Times, 12 Feb. 1801.
65 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 1, 65; Summary of the Trial,
42-3, 45 n.; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 142. The hops case was
R. v. Maynard (1631), Cro.Car. 231 (79 ER 802); it was well known because

widely reported in the standard justices' manuals and abridgements as late as the
1790s.
66 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 1, 4, 27. In doing so, Erskine
began arguing that, since engrossing or raising the price of wheat was an offence, the
same must be true of hops, the reverse of his argument when Waddington's Cases
began. Rushy had been convicted in the interval.

ment. The prosecution did not have to reply to allegations that
others did what Waddington had done.67
Indeed, it did not even try to prove that Waddington had
affected the market in hops (the witnesses flatly contradicted one
another), but simply asserted that conspiracies did exist, that the
poor were starving, and that the one caused the other. In other
words, narrowly legal arguments were almost irrelevant: the cases
were actually an extended rhetorical contest to denigrate, or
legitimate, Smith's theory of markets and its application to hops,
then corn. 68
Bargains for future delivery of growing crops were the rule in
the hop trade, essential to the security of growers of a highly
uncertain crop, and Waddington made them openly. This defence
argument was crucial because Waddington's forehand contracts,
on a rising scale of prices, looked to an outsider very like a
deliberate attempt to move the market up, although the case law
shows a brewer using one to secure his malt as early as 1532. But
the suspicions on the bench probably went deeper. Patrick Atiyah
has pointed out how foreign to a lawyer of traditional cast of
mind such a contract could appear. The wholly executory contract, for future performance, he argues, was not then the paradigm that it was to become in the nineteenth century. A notion
of an underlying equivalence in bargains, however attenuated,
was still part of the way that judges thought. To such men, the
very idea of making a profit through a price rise on a forehand
contract might be thought immoral if its results were against
public policy. This clearly was the view of Erskine and Kenyon.
Erskine apparently did not believe that the usual practices in the
hop trade could be considered a defence, as it was presented; he
used it against Waddington. Kenyon, in his private bench notes,
marked particularly all the testimony proving 'forehand
bargains'. 69
To the argument that Waddington controlled far too little of
67 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 2, 62, 64, 73, 72; Summary of
the Trial, 17, 20, 25; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 125, 57, 118, 121,

129-30. The doctrine of clean hands, part of equity, applied also in King's Bench
with respect to criminal informations: see Hay, Crown Side Cases.
68 There were also two arguments that the evidence did not prove exactly what the
information charged, but Kenyon rejected one and ignored the other: Proceedings in
the Cause the King v. Waddington, 71, 76; Summary of the Trial, 26. Kenyon seldom
wrote his judgements: Kenyon, Life of K enyon, 391.
69 Atiyah uses the law reports of these cases as part of his general argument. The
reports do not, of course, show how much effort Waddington's counsel put into the
( cont . on p. 124)

the market to be convicted of engrossing, the prosecution (and
Kenyon) replied that he had boasted of doing so, that ten men
might control the market, or simply that he and his agents had
swept the market like 'locusts'. This was the venerable rhetoric
of the traditional moral economy and, to counter it, Edward Law,
Waddington's counsel, used both practical and theoretical arguments. The practical one was that middlemen were essential,
particularly to supply London. The statute of Edward VI was
'insane': the old law would starve the capital in two days. To this
highly practical argument Kenyon made the extraordinary reply
that the statesmen of Edward VI, and equally those of Elizabeth
I and James I, were neither 'insane', nor 'ideots'. The legislation
of Edward VI might well be better than that of 12 George III.70
Kenyon's irritation arose from the fact that the principal argument of the defence was a condescending lesson in political economy. Mistaken notions on the bench and elsewhere could be
corrected by exposure to the wisdom of Dr Smith, author of that
'learned and luminous performance . . . upon the wealth of
nations, from the reading of which no person, however richly
endowed with previous knowledge, ever arose, without finding
his funds of knowledge and information amply increased,
enlarged, and improved'. Law lectured Kenyon on the wisdom
of Smith's devotee, that 'eminent and eloquent person', Edmund
Burke, and of some of the 'ablest', 'most enlightened', 'warmly
benevolent', 'judicious' men in the recent history of parliament,
who had seen to the enactment of the repealing statute of 1772.
And he reminded the Chief Justice that the repeal now bore the
imprimatur of both Fox and Pitt.
( n. 69 cont.)

effort to educate the bench in trade practices and economic theory; Atiyah also
incorrectly represents Ellenborough as sharing Kenyon's opinions. Kenyon does seem
to exemplify Atiyah's account of the eighteenth-century bench's unease with certain
kinds of contracts for future performance. Waddington complained in 1811 that
Kenyon had nonsuited him in King's Bench repeatedly when he sued farmers for
non-payment on forehand contracts. I have not found these cases, but see below at
n. 161 for Waddington's lawsuits against Bristow and others. The Reports of Sir John
Spelman, ed. J. H. Baker (Seldon Soc., xciv, 1978), 247; Atiyah, Rise and Fall of
Freedom of Contract, 128-9, 363-5, 528; Proceedings in the Cause the King v.
Waddingion, 27ff., 39, 47-8, 57, 67-8, 73; Summary of the Trial, 38; Trial against
Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 85; Kenyon MSS, Term 3 Dec. 1800 to 18 Feb. 1801;
PRO, HO 42/ 116, fos. 144-5, petition of Samuel Ferrand Waddington to the Prince
Regent, Tonbridge Wells, 4 July 1811, enclosed with a letter from Waddington to
the Prince Regent, Southboro Tonbridge, 4 July 1811.
70 Proceedings in the Cause the King ·v. Waddington, 2-3, 62-3, 75; Summary of the
Trial, 36, 50; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 139.

To this (hardly legal) argument, Law had the temerity to add
a fairly extensive seminar in supply and demand, the rationing
functions of markets in dearth, the 'general principles of commerce', the merits of the trading interest of the nation and the
mysteries of price theory. He quoted Burke:
The market settles, and alone can settle, that price. Market is the meeting
and conference of the consumer and producer, when they mutually discover each others wants. Nobody, I believe, has observed with any
reflection what market is, without being astonished at the truth, the
correctness, the civility, the general equity with which the balance of
wants is settled. They who wish the destruction of that balance, and
would fain, by arbitrary regulations, decree, that defective production
should not be compensated by increased price, directly lay their axe to
the root of production itself.

So much for arbitrary Chief Justices: mistaken, uncivil, inequitable, when compared to the market mechanism. Or at least some
Chief Justices: Law pointedly remarked on Lord Mansfield's
enlightened hostility to the marketing laws.71
From the beginning of the prosecutions Kenyon had known
that his chief adversary was the dead professor from Glasgow.
Throughout the case and some others in the same months he had
attacked Smith as an impractical theorist, Burke as someone
'equally speculative'. He scorned Smith's comparison of the old
marketing laws with those against witchcraft and declared that
he would not enter into a discussion of The Wealth of Nations.
The Lord Chief Justice deplored the repeal of 1772 and called
for the re-enactment of the old statute laws. Fortunately, the
common law had been left untouched. It is clear that Kenyon
was a man with some robust and unfashionable notions, as well
as a readiness to find in the law what he thought important. In
short, he was much like many other judges of this - indeed,
all -periods. What he found important was the immorality of
playing the markets, the nefariousness of starving the poor. He
thought the offences real, and human suffering their result. 72
For the case was dominated not by law, but by the tremendous
crisis of dearth in 1800 and 1801. Its enormous pressure was felt
throughout all the proceedings: crowds packed the courtrooms;
71 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 2, 61, 63, 70, 73; Summary of
the Trial, 34, 43-4, 46; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 124, 137, 144. Law
was quoting Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity: see above, n. 27.
72 Times, 17 May, 9 June, 21 Nov. 1800; also 'Law Report, Dent v. Howes', Times,
7 June 1800; General Evening Post, 7 June 1800; Proceedings in the Cause the King v.
Waddington, 5.

cheers greeted the guilty verdicts. Waddington's lawyers begged
the juries to forget popular prejudice, to beware inflaming the
minds of the people. The prosecution regularly countered with
references to 'this awful and alarming crisis', and claims that, if
'to starve the people had been his object', Waddington could
have done no more. Counsel on both sides involved themselves
in contradictions. Waddington's lawyers pleaded with juries to
think only of hops, but argued also that free trade supplied towns
with corn. The prosecution argued that the statutes were repealed
in 1772 because corn, unlike hops, could not be engrossed, and
then made the forbidden analogy in order to demand a precedent
on hops that could in turn be applied to corn. Erskine 'prayed
their Lordships, . . . and every person who heard him, for a
moment, to suppose that he was not speaking of Hops, but of
Corn, and then say, what was to become of the people of this
country'. Law, for his part, came to rest the defence case on a
general proposition of immense resonance: 'Instances like these
must strike at the root and foundation of all property, and every
right of the free controul and disposition in respect of the same'. 73
These were questions of utmost moment, and the government
was unequivocally giving a different answer from Kenyon's. We
must ask why there was such a sharp discrepancy between the
bench and the parliamentary leaders; and we must explain why
Kenyon's doctrine was abandoned so rapidly after his death.
III
THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MORAL ECONOMY

Kenyon's dismissive comments about commercial practice, his
own admission of ignorance about the London corn market,
suggest how different he was from Mansfield, with his merchant
juries and project to re-order commercial law. But much of
Kenyon's response to the cases and the way that it was expressed
also appears to have come from his own knowledge of the suffering caused by the dearth of the years 1799-1801, as well as
from the dictates of his faith.
Kenyon was one of the wealthiest of the judges in a generation
of conspicuous judicial wealth, although he was of humbler origins
73 Summary of the Trial, 21, 48; Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 4,
71; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 147; Times, 17 May 1800.

than some. He was typical of many eighteenth-century lawyers
(unlike those of the nineteenth) who made a fortune from the
profession and then sought to establish a landed dynasty. With a
reputation for parsimony, he poured all of his fees into the estate
he assembled at Hanmer in Shropshire. In his new role as a
territorial magnate, he embraced the paternalist repertoire of the
benevolent country gentleman, a role that in any case was to be
expected considering his religious convictions (which were probably particularly acute at about this time). 74
The dearth of 1799-1801 hit hard at Hanmer. Even during the
harvest of 1800 a Shropshire labourer could not earn enough to
feed a family of any size. One consequence was housebreaking in
the neighbourhood, but no damage was done, as the thieves
looked only for food. Although he was in London most of the
time, the Chief Justice ensured that his poor were relieved,
instructing a niece at Hanmer to buy corn and sell it at less than
market price. She wrote regularly about the results: 'I have this
morning been again dispensing part of my dear Uncles bounty at
Hanmer. I don't know what would have become of the poor but
for him'. 'May the blessings of 64 poor people come upon my
dear Uncle and all his family'. The poor came to a parlour
window, described their wants and presumably their industriousness, and received a ticket from Kenyon's niece describing
their entitlement. They took the ticket to a tenant's buildings to
receive the corn. All this entailed standing in the rain all day,
waiting while the line moved up to the window to get the ticket
for food, 'for which they did All seem truly thankful to My dear
Uncle'. He apparently gave instructions that only the truly deserving should be relieved, and his niece wrote him that she would
not be so free next time, but choose those 'in much want yet
very striving'. The results were gratifying in every way. In the
summer of 1800 Kenyon's son wrote to him that the people 'all
joined in thanks to you for your bounty to them last winter which
has very far exceeded that of any of the neighbouring gentlemen,
& without which several of them declare they think they would
have been starved'. The following year Kenyon's family again
sold corn at the parlour window. He also sent down twenty-four
pairs of blankets and other goods for the poor of Hanmer, a
response to letters from Shropshire pointing out that the expense
74 Daniel Duman, The Judicial Bench in England, 1727-1875 (London, 1982), 128,
140-3; Kenyon, Life of Kenyon, 393-6.

of corn was so great that nothing was left for fire or clothing in
a labourer's family if there were a number of children. How
appalling that so much of this suffering should be unnecessary:
Lady Kenyon wrote, 'I wish one knew how to soften the Hearts
of Corn dealers, but Corn is now 20s . . . tho there are such
Quantities of Grain coming in daily'.75
Strangers too wrote to Kenyon in his capacity as Chief Justice,
confirming what he knew from his own family. An anonymous
correspondent from County Durham blamed the 'villainy' of
'wealthy base men' on the public statements of Portland and
Grenville. A man in Norwich sent Kenyon detailed suggestions
for detecting and punishing forestallers and regrators, suggestions
originally intended for his MP, 'but as I found that he was fearfull
that it would hurt him in the opinion of his constituents, the
principal part of whom are in the Corn Trade . . . and recollecting
that your Lordships Justice and zeal had prompted You to be
active for the comfort of the Poor, I thought I could not do better
than to direct it to Your Lordships attention'. Kenyon's widely
reported statements in court thus brought to his notice the extent
to which many shared his opinions and the existence of hard
evidence of illegal practices, evidence that it seemed could not
be brought to the attention of parliament. 76
This traditional explanation for the dearth, always popular with
landed country gentlemen, was much less convincing to the
London legal and political elites. Country gentlemen read Burn's
Justice of the Peace, with its reiteration of Coke's strictures on
engrossing middlemen, but London barristers and members of
parliament were more likely to read The Wealth of Nations or
Barrington's Observations on the More Ancient Statutes, or Burke.
And lawyers, as professional men without country estates, were
also less likely to have the direct experience of local paternalism
shown in Kenyon's correspondence with his niece. There were
also other, long-standing, tensions between Kenyon and the bar.
75 T. Hanmer to Hon. George Kenyon, Hot Wells, Bristol, 16 July 1800: Kenyon
MSS, box 23; also in box 23, see Lady Hanmer to Kenyon, Bettisfield, [5 Feb.?]
1800, about selling corn valued at 14s. 7d. a measure for 8s.; Lady Hanmer to Kenyon,
8 Apr. 1800 (she noted, however, that 'very very few' had relief from the parish);
Richard Kenyon to Kenyon, Chester, 2 Aug. 1800; in box 25, see M. Hanmer to
Kenyon, 18 Feb. 1801; Lady Kenyon to one of her children, 4 Aug. [1801].
76 Anonymous letter to Kenyon from co. Durham, 14 Feb. 1801: Kenyon MSS,
box 25; for Samuel Bream to Kenyon, Norwich, 24 Oct. 1800, enclosing his letter of
8 Oct. to 'Honoured Sir', see box 24.

He was respected as an able enough judge, but his indifference
to appearance, and his origins, made him a subject of jest to some
lawyers. An attorney before he was a barrister, and with only a
little Latin, he was not popular with those who felt the rough
side of his tongue. They retaliated by portraying him as uncouth
and avaricious. 77
On the other hand, he was often popular with the press and
with the wider public, in part because he castigated the sins of
the mighty as well as the humble. His moral crusades provoked
much indignation and amusement in his later years. He was the
scourge of adulterers who found themselves in his courtroom.
He condemned gaming and threatened 'the first ladies in the
land', if they were guilty, with the pillory. Duellists who committed murder, and journalists who spread scandalous libels about
private persons, particularly innocent young ladies, enraged him.
In all of this he was contesting some of the principle pastimes of
the aristocracy, and such criticisms from a man bred a mere
attorney, one who had not even been to university, was doubly
insulting.
Kenyon was also critical of cheating farmers or tradesmen who
did not behave with propriety. 78 In the year before Waddington's
Case, he made clear his role as chief moral censor in the market77 William C. Townshend, The Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges (London, 1846), 116,
123; Public Characters, 4th edn, 10 vols. (London, 1799-1809); Kenyon, Lif e of
Kenyon, 87, 136, 393, 402. On the legal and other literature earlier in the century,
see Hay, 'Moral Economy, Political Economy, and Law'. Erskine, who espoused so
many popular causes in the courts, is a notable exception to much of the bar in this
respect . The youngest son of the impecunious and Methodistical tenth earl of Buchan,
he had experience as both a naval and army officer before coming to the bar, and it
seems likely that this background fostered his own belief in the traditional measures:
for Erskine's views and those of military men, see below 133, 156, 158.
78 Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminelll Judges, 66-73, 86-8. Some convictions of
farmers under Restoration statutes for not using the Winchester bushel in measuring
wheat came before him in 1782 and 1783. He expressed his annoyance in the latter
case: 'I am sorry that the obstinacy of the farmers, in some parts of the Kingdom,
has partly defeated the provisions of the statutes of Cha. II because, after the case of
K. v. Major . . . was decided, we had an opportunity of knowing from the grand
juries in different counties, that the decision gave great satisfaction'. R. v. Major and
R. v. Arnold, cited in Girdler, Observa1ions on Fores1alling, 119-22; R. v. Major (1792)
4 Term Reports 750 (100 ER 1282); R. v. Arnold (1793) 5 Term Reports 353 ( 101
ER 197). During periodsof dearth the relationship of customary to standard measures,
which co-existed until the nineteenth century, was a sensitive one to suspicious
consumers: see Thompson, 'Moral Economy'; Julian Hoppit, 'Reforming Britain's
Weights and Measures, 1660-1824', Eng. Hist. Rev., cviii (1993); see Adrian Randall
and Andrew Chqrlesworth (eds.), Markers, Market Culture and Popular Pro1es1 in
Eight eenth-Century Britain and Ireland, (Liverpool, 1996), 8-9, ch. 2.

place in two important labour cases. The 1799 prosecution of
Hammond and Webb, two shoemakers, was for a conspiracy
carried on by the London journeymen against their masters to
raise wages. Kenyon declared that conspiracies by masters were
equally illegal and that they 'would become the objects of much
severer punishment than the poor journeymen':
The law of England held the balance even, upon the scale of Justice,
between the rich and poor. Those who were to administer that justice,
from their feelings as men, which he hoped he should always carry about
him, were naturally led to protect the lower orders of the community,
and who, some of them, had perhaps no other protection than the Law.

And he warned the journeymen that if conspiracies went unpunished, they would have to fear not only those of masters, but also
those of middlemen: 'Suppose butchers were to combine to raise
the price of meat, and farmers the price of corn'. The deluded
journeymen were warned that if they had succeeded they would
have laid 'the foundation for raising the price of corn, and the
price of meat, as well as the price of all the articles of life, without
many of which they could not exist'. In another case the same
week, Kenyon warned the master ropemakers that a resolution
they had made to hire only journeymen with discharges from
their former masters was 'neither just nor legal': 'the men would
thus become the slaves of the masters', and through such combinations 'the country might be undone'. An attempt by Essex
labourers to raise their wages in the dearth of 1800 through
'Insurrection and Conspiracy', however, was denounced as a
heinous offence bordering on high treason. The Times congratulated Kenyon, noting at the same time that 'his Lordship's
decisions have alarmed all classes of regrators, and other such
delinquents'. 79
His belief that 'The Law' properly balanced the interests of all
classes in the marketplace, his willingness to castigate conspirators
and profiteers, and his particular concern for the poor were
characteristic of his moralizing approach in the marketing cases
also. Imagining a case in which ten wealthy men engrossed a
town's supply of corn for a fortnight, he asked, in the final
arguments on one of Waddington's cases: 'Would not the poor
79 Radical Politics and the Working M an in England, ser. 2, 'The Francis Place
Collection in the British Library Department of Printed Books' (Harvester Microform
edn, 1981), reel 23, set 39, 154, reports of 18, 23 Feb. 1799, probably from Morning
Chron.; Times, 9, 13 Aug. 1800. I owe this information to Lynn MacKay.

be starved, and would not the conduct of these monsters be
contrary to law, to morality, and to religion?' That many shared
his moral revulsion was confirmed by his correspondence. Four
days before final judgement on Waddington, a Doncaster evangelical clergyman wrote to compliment him on his assaults on sin,
even among the great ones of the world:
how wonderful are the dispensations of Providence - that He should
raise up so noble an advocate to lead his cause . . . It is thro Him -you
speak, act & think . . . I met with your speech on Mr Waddington 's
business -it shot into my oppressed heart a beam of holy joy -& it is
only right you should know you are not labouring in vain.

'Marcus Aurelius' wrote from Bristol in praise of 'your protecting
Care over the Cause of Religion and Morality': 'continue my
Lord to snatch the poor and the distress'd from the Iron Fang of
the Oppressor to make Vice tremble tho' shielded by Title
Opulence & Power'. Samuel Glasse, the prominent evangelical
cleric and magistrate, wrote to ask permission to dedicate a work
on the ten commandments: 'Your Lordship's Pole-Star
of
Direction in your judicial course is well known to be the Law of
God as it is recognized by the Laws of our Country'. Glasse and
William Mainwaring, who introduced the forestalling bill of 1797,
were members of the Proclamation Society. Kenyon had been a
member in its early years. 80
These letters, and their authors, are a reminder that Kenyon 's
dislike of fraud, of the sins of the wealthy which hurt the poor,
and of wickedness in general, was fortified by deep religious
convictions shared by a wider educated public, perhaps particularly by evangelical gentlemen not convinced by new economic
theory.81 Kenyon's own faith apparently became stronger in later
Bo Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 55, 76; Payler Mathew Proctor
to Kenyon, Hatfield (Yorks.), 24 Nov. 1800: Kenyon MSS, box 24; he concluded
with the observation that it was comforting to know there was a communion of saints
even on earth; 'Marcus Aurelius' to Kenyon, Bristol, 28 Aug. 1801: Kenyon MSS,
box 25; Samuel Glasse to Kenyon, Greenford, 25 Feb. 1801: Kenyon MSS, box 25.
Glasse was the author of a wide range of religious works and also a handbook for
JPs. On Glasse and Mainwaring, see Joanna Innes, 'Politics and Morals: The
Reformation of Manners Movement in Later Eighteenth-Century England', in
Eckhart Hellmuth (ed.), The Transformation of Political Culture: England and Germany
in the Lat e Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1990), which is also the source for Kenyon's
membership of the Proclamation Society and the fact that he probably resigned on
becoming Chief Justice.
Bi As well as Girdler, Glasse and Mainwaring, see the comments of Sir Richard Hill
and William Wilberforce (also members of the Proclamation Society), quoted above
at n. 35.

life. He was said never to have missed attending church in twentysix years. 82 In 1800 he was an old man, almost seventy, and at
the time of Waddington's second trial and judgements he was
plunged in grief by a crisis which undoubtedly intensified his
preoccupation with his faith. His beloved eldest son had become
seriously ill in the spring of 1800, worsened while Kenyon was
on the summer assize circuit, and died on 15 September.83 The
intensity of his mourning, his own anticipation of death (he died
in April 1802) and his sense of his Christian duty to the poor,
help explain the strength of his certitude in the marketing cases.
His language in the final arguments, two months after the death
of his son, was often that of the biblical prophet: the regrator
'sins against the moral feelings of men' and commits 'an immoral,
a very immoral act'; laws must be 'not inconsistent with the laws
of God';84 'we are objects of the constant attention of the benign
Ruler of the Universe'; 85 'if [Mr Waddington] can lay his hand
upon his breast and say I am innocent -if his conscience acquits
him, I hope he will meet with mercy at the tribunal of God!' 86
And he silenced Adam Smith with a greater text:
When we were at Church last Sunday (I am a grave man, and I speak to
grave men), we heard upon this subject the words of inspiration. "He",
says the King of Israel, "who withholdeth corn, shall be cursed, and woe
unto him that keepeth back bread from the people". 87

But, of course, Kenyon did not rely only on scripture for precedent. He was, after all, Chief Justice of the common-law world.
And he also had Thomas Erskine.
Kenyon had made clear as early as February that he thought
the common law provided ample powers, but he knew he would
not have to hear final argument on the law until Michaelmas
term, in November, when Waddington would come up for judgement. He was clearly discussing the case with other judges, noTownshend, Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, 116.
Kenyon MSS, Diaries; Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, 114, misdates
this 1801.
84 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 76.
82
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Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 6.
87 Ibid ., 5. The passage is the only biblical reference to corn that was useful to
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Kenyon, but it also appears that he misquoted to the advantage of his own argument,
as critics said he often did. In the King James version it reads : 'He that withholdeth
corn, the people shall curse him: but blessing shall be upon the head of him that
selleth it ' (Prov. 11:26). Blessing is not explicitly withheld from him that reselleth in
the same market .

tably Lawrence. What is more interesting is that he was in direct
communication with the prosecution. Erskine had led for the
prosecution on both informations against Waddington. His eloquence had been sarcastic, disinterested, pathetic by turns, as he
spoke of middlemen, the law and the poor. He had other advantages. He was believed to be the Chief Justice's favourite at the
bar, while Law, counsel for Rushy and Waddington, emphatically
was not. 88 In the arguments on Waddington's second conviction,
Kenyon derided an assertion in Law's final address to the court:
'There is no saying what you will not confidently contend, Mr
Law'. 89 Henry Clifford, another of Waddington's lawyers, was
notoriously an advanced Whig and a Catholic, and he had recently
exchanged insults with Kenyon in another political case. Silenced
by Kenyon in court, Clifford had then published a pamphlet
reflecting on the Chief Justice's origins as a poor attorney. 90
To these advantages Erskine added advocacy in private. A
letter he wrote to Kenyon on 15 October 1800, after the jury
verdict in Worcester but before final judgement and before
Waddington's second trial, shows that prosecuting counsel and
judge had privately discussed the cases and continued to do so in
the vacation. In the new term Kenyon would probably have to
answer further arguments, as Waddington and Rusby's counsel
were likely to move for a new trial or in arrest of judgement. 91
Erskine's letter was in fact written a full six weeks before Kenyon
gave final judgement against Waddington in King's Bench.
Erskine was unequivocal. He alluded to Kenyon's rumoured
retirement, trying to dissuade him, in part on grounds that he
still had 'great duties to perform'. These were made clear:
You are perfectly right in the view you have taken of the evils arising
from the high prices of provisions, and of the law which visits and corrects
88 Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, 43, 54, 77; Campbell, Lives of the
Chief Justices, iii, 133-4.
89 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 71.
90 'We seldom observe in our hereditary peers those pedantic notions of impracticable morality, or that boisterous impetuosity of manners, which sometimes accompany
and disgrace, even in the highest situations, those who have been raised to them from
the desk, merely on account of their industry and professional success': Henry
Clifford, Proceedings in the House of Lords in the Case of Benjamin Flower (1800),
quoted in Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, 58; Proceedings in the Cause
the King v. Waddington, 41. Clifford was the nephew of Hugh, 4th Baron Clifford.
91 They did so: Rusby's motion for a new trial was made on 7 November
and
argued 25 November; Waddington, whose counsel had given notice of a similar
motion, waived the right on 20 November, but the court none the less heard counsel
and treated it as a hearing for a new trial or in arrest of judgement.

them. I have looked at the subject since we met, and am sure of what I
say. The war, undoubtedly, and the vast circulation of paper, increases
the public suffering; but, depend upon it, the whole system of trade in
provisions has been entirely changed. There are now only great landholders (the farmers) and great merchants with great capitals, in lines
which were not formerly considered as the occupations of merchants.
They sweep the whole country before them, in the purchase of the
necessaries of life, and they command the markets.

But Erskine did more than strongly reinforce Kenyon's moral
condemnation of market conditions. He added:
I have not found a case, almost, in which I have been consulted, that the
common law will not reach; and perhaps that is one of the evils attending
the repeal of the statutes; they served at once as helps and as qualifications
of the common law, in cases where its principles might have reached
too far.92

Erskine thus confirmed for Kenyon that the doctrine to which
he was so attracted on the grounds of tradition, paternalism and
religious conviction was also, without question, good law. If, by
October, Erskine wondered whether the powers of the common
law were perhaps too wide (he had made the opposite argument
in February),93 that was a question of public policy, and Kenyon
had his own decided views on that.
There is some surviving evidence of the arguments that Kenyon
and his brother judges found most compelling, although they did
not feel it necessary or relevant to reproduce them all in court. 94
Kenyon's last public words on Rushy were cast entirely in terms
of the dating and definition of the term 'ingrosser' as found in
the standard legal texts. He concluded: 'Finding these authorities
I cannot on the ground of any abstract reasoning say that regrating
is not an offence at Common Law'.95 Yet sometime in the later
months of 1800 and early 1801 the judges of King's Bench also
privately considered the 'abstract reasoning' of Smith and Burke
92 'Thomas Erskine to Kenyon, 15 Oct. 1800', HM C K enyon, 544 no. 1418; Kenyon
MSS, HMC Calendared, no. 1418.
93 Times, 10 Feb. 1800.
94 Lincoln's Inn Library, London, Dampier MSS, L.P.B. 339a. This bundle
of
papers once belonged to Sir Soulden Lawrence, a puisne judge of King's Bench when
Waddington and Rusby were tried, and appear to be in his hand. Lawrence took
some of the depositions in the Kent prosecution (e.g., PRO, KB 1130, Hilary 1800,
deposition of Peter Broadley et al., Thomas Ellis, 5-6 Feb. 1800). I wish to thank
the Honourable Treasurer and Benchers of Lincoln's Inn for permission to use and
quote from these papers.
95 In what appears to be the ruling on the motion for arrest of judgement , argued
31 January 1801.

and Law with some care, in a series of memoranda on markets
and market theory. 96
They were not impressed. Was the market too big for concerted
conspiracy? No: 'corresponding societies shew how easy [is] communication'. Were middlemen necessary to prevent famine?
Surely scarcity alone would raise the price sufficiently to ration
supply, without their machinations. Farmers had to come to
market and the price then was a fair one; the ingrosser had no
such compulsion, but could hold back what he had paid less for,
forcing the price to rise. When the price was set by buyers free
not to buy and sellers free not to sell, the market might work;
when buyers had to buy from sellers not obliged to sell, the
market failed. The price would be fair only when production was
'not fraudulently lessened by corn kept back'. And combination
was not an imaginary possibility: Mark Lane 'regulates the whole
kingdom'. The arguments of Smith applied to the whole market,
if at all, but forestalling and regrating might 'hurt the inhabitants
of a particular place'. In the margin of Smith's argument that
'those who may be hindered from supplying themselves on that
market day, may supply themselves as cheap on another', is
written the query, 'What are they [to] do in the mean time? Eat
they must'.
The judges clearly relied on the current pamphlet debate for
critiques of Smith.97 The claim that 'trade will find its level' did
not apply to limited goods with a fixed level of consumption, or
where the seller controlled the buyer, or where the good was an
absolute necessity, all of which applied to corn. Buckles, buttons,
ribbons and clothes were one kind of good; corn was emphatically
of a different kind. And since hackney coaches, interest rates and
wages of journeymen were all regulated, why should not the
96 There is a summary of Smith's defence of corn merchants in Wealth of Nations,
some passages from Burke's Thoughts on Scarcity, and references to some of the
arguments produced by counsel. The following passages are all found in Lincoln's
Inn Lib., Dampier MSS, L.P.B. 339a, which is not paginated. Whether Lawrence's
summaries were the basis of the conclusions of all four judges is not clear. Kenyon's
own correspondence and public utterances do not suggest a knowledgeable or sophisticated view of markets: it seems likely that he relied upon Lawrence's conclusions
without following his reasoning in detail.
97 One of the memoranda, after the summary of Smith's argument, abstracts [Sir
William Young], Corn Trade: An Examination of Certain Commercial Principles in their
Application to Agriculture and the Corn Trade (London, 1800), which called for the
restoration of statute law to reach not only the 'petty forestaller' but also great
wholesalers.

market in corn be regulated also -'if it be necessary some times
to interfere the general rule can hold'? Smith had admitted that
'the real monopolist' wicked enough to raise prices by false
alarms, combination or undue means undoubtedly could exist,
and Burke appeared to admit that fraud could infect even the
corn market. 98
Dismissing political economy, Kenyon and the other judges
dealt also with another defence: that criminal acts should be
shown to be the result of criminal intent and have harmful consequences. The judges appear to have concluded that the repealed
statute of Edward VI made clear that the offence was criminal,
'without any consideration of intent and effect', and that that
statute was simply declaratory of the common law. 99 In the end,
unconvinced by the new economics, believing that a large body
of old statute and case law showed that the acts themselves had
always been deemed criminal, and persuaded to a moral certainty
that profit-taking in times of famine was wicked in the eyes of
the law and God, Kenyon and his brother judges found the
convictions of Rushy and Waddington to be sound in law and
policy. Pitt might tell the House (as he did on the opening of
parliament, 11 November 1800) that the system of market regulation of 500 years ago was irrelevant and dangerous, 100 but the
judges would decide the matter.
In resisting parliamentary opinion, Kenyon may have sensed
that he had important constitutional support. Kenyon held George
III in the very highest esteem. 101 On 27 November, the day before
Kenyon passed judgement on Waddington, Lady Kenyon had an
audience with the king, who received her kindly and expressed
concern for her safety in travelling home to Shropshire for
98 One of the summaries quotes Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, 21; the
word 'fraud' is twice underlined.
99 Lincoln's Inn Lib., Dampier MSS, L.P.B. 339a, on a single sheet of rough notes
dealing with these two issues; also in the bundle is a copy of the information in the
Kent prosecution of Waddington, in which the passages referring to intent and to
consequences are all underlined.
100 He also allowed that it might be unwise 'to be guided solely by speculative
systems of political economy', but his biographer a few years later noted that in his
speech 'he displayed notions of political economy not less correct than those which
he manifested on matters of legislation and government': John Gifford, A History of
the Political Life . . . of William Pitt, 6 vols. (London, 1809), vi, 525-9.
101 He eulogized the king in addresses to grand juries, sometimes concluding with
a quotation from scripture: 'Our good King may say with Samuel of old, "Whose ox
have I taken? Whose ass have I taken? Whom have I defrauded?" ' (I Sam. 12:3):
Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, 113.

Christmas. But the king also had a message for the Chief Justice:
he 'said he [Lord Kenyon] was doing all he could to keep these
forestallers in order, and thought they would feel it; seemed
pleased with what he had done about Waddington'. 102 If Kenyon
had any doubts about the wisdom of confirming judgement against
Waddington, the king's clear approval the day before must have
been decisive.
E. P. Thompson's dichotomy between 'traditionalists' and
'economists' on the issue of regulating markets in food is fully
illustrated in the marketing cases. Certainly between Burke and
Kenyon, or Law and Erskine, ·there was no mere difference of
emphasis, no mere argument within the structure of the new
economics, but a moral and empirical gulf that seemed in 1800
unlikely to be bridged. 103 Kenyon, and other judges like Hotham,
Graham and Grose certainly spoke like traditionalists, using in
public comment almost entirely moral arguments; their references
to political economy were either simple denigrations or criticisms
of its speculative excesses. 104 To a lawyer of Kenyon's deep
religious views, Burke must have seemed not only mistaken and
hard-hearted, but also blasphemous, when he wrote, in words
widely reprinted in 1800, of 'the laws of commerce, which are
the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God'. 105 The
Chief Justice knew a different truth: 'Our [common] law, thank
God, is the same with the divine'. 106

102 'Mary, Lady Kenyon to her sisters, 29 Nov. [1800]', in HM C Kenyon, 558 no.
1429; Kenyon MSS, no. 1429, reporting an audience of Thursday (27 Nov.). In HM C
Kenyon it is dated 1801, although the contents make clear that it was written before
final judgement; no date appears on the manuscript letter which also contains the
remarks about Lady Kenyon's trip. Kenyon passed judgement on Waddington, thus
confirming the verdict of the jury, on 28 November: see Proceedings in the Cause the
King v. Waddington, 6. For other comments on Waddington in Lady Kenyon's letter
not published in HM C Kenyon, see below; for his relations with George III, see
Kenyon, Life of Kenyon, 281-3.
103 See above, text at n. 21.
104 I have not been able to establish whether Mr Justice Lawrence, the apparent
author of the private criticisms of Smith cited above, made similar arguments in public.
105 Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, 32.
106 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 5, after arguments on the motion
for arrest of judgement in the Worcester prosecution. On the role of scripture in
judicial rhetoric and as a source of law, see Douglas Hay, 'The Laws of God and the
Laws of Man: Lord George Gordon and the Death Penalty', in John Rule and Robert
Malcolmson (eds.), Protest and Survival: The Historical Experience: Essays for E. P.
Thompson (London, 1993), 95ff.

IV
ORDER, PROPERTY, LAW

Most of the other eleven common-law judges supported Kenyon's
interpretation, but not all shared his moralizing outlook. To
explain the near-unanimity of the bench in 1800 in the face of
leading parliamentary opinion, and their subsequent lack of agreement, we must consider the implications of an issue that probably
mattered most in the end. From September 1800, the duke of
Portland and others in government had been stressing the sanctity
of private property. 107 In his last argument before Lord Kenyon,
Law made the point:
Will the law dispossess the man who requires the terms of his property?
Will it punish him as an extortioner, for so doing? No . . . it has not yet
been contended that every man has not a right to put his own price, at
least, upon his own land, and the uses thereof . . . Instances like these
must strike at the root and foundation of all property, and every right of
the free controul and disposition in respect of the same. It strikes equally
at the foundation and free rights of property, thus to question this gentleman with Hops. 108

Waddington himself made the same point to the public. 109
The first answer from the judges was that property presumed
a prior social good: order. The public-order argument had been
in Kenyon's mind for years as a justification that transcended (or
at least strongly qualified) all quibbles about such issues as the
status of hops in the common law, let alone the theories of Smith.
In the first, preliminary hearing of Waddington's case, on
8 February 1800, Kenyon observed:
A few years ago it became my duty to state to a Grand Jury, that
Forestalling was clearly an offence at Common Law; and if I had not done
so, I do not know what would have been the consequence. When I went
to Oxford corn was dear, the people threatened an insurrection, and the
whole country was alarmed. I stated what the law was, and the punishment
that awaited those who were guilty of this offence. When the people knew
there was a law to resort to, it composed their minds, and the alarm
ceased. This is a thing most essential to the existence of the country. 110
107
108

Wells, Wretched Faces, 238.
Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 70-1, moving from the argument

that it is lawful to charge for easements over land for the transport of coal, thus
increasing the price of a necessity, to the analogy of foodstuffs. On the property issue,
see also Hont and lgnatieff, 'Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations', 14.
109 Summary of the Trial, vi.
110 Times, 10 Feb. 1800 (hearing for rule nisi). Kenyon was on the Oxford circuit
in 1795, but he conflates a sequence. The press accounts suggest that at Oxford, faced
with riot, he urged only repression; it was not until he arrived at Shrewsbury that he
/com. on p. 139)

This conviction, that promulgation of the existence of the offences
of forestalling, regrating and engrossing was essential for pacifying the mob, undoubtedly owed something to Kenyon's discussions with country magistrates. 111 From many accounts of food
riots, and encounters between rioters and gentlemen, we know
that the restoration of public order depended largely on the ability
of JPs to convince rioters that something would be done. As
'Governor' Thomas Pownall put it in 1795, the people would be
'patient' and 'peaceable' if justices were seen to be acting; otherwise, there would be 'insurgent demands of redress' , which like
hammered steel would acquire 'a temper of resistance and recoil,
which will not and cannot by any force be kept down . . . the
people in their hunger will not perceive that they are doing
wrong'. It was thus imperative that steps be taken to deal with
forestalling. 112 By far the easiest response was to promise, and
perhaps carry out, a few prosecutions of middlemen. This was
self-evident to judges earlier in the century. Sir Thomas Parker,
Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, wrote to his brother on
King's Bench, Sir John Eardley Wilmot, during the great riots
of 1756:
none of the Rioters were Indicted before me at Stafford, so that all the
Service I could do my Country was to endeavour to prevent such disturbances for the future, by declaring in my Charge what remedy the Law
had provided against Engrossing, and the other abuses complained of, if
they were really aggrieved, but I repeated to make the better impression,
that Outrage and Violence were not to be endured under any pretext
whatsoever .113

As the marquis of Buckingham observed to Kenyon, just after
Rusby's conviction, Buckingham's own conviction of Battams in
1796 'operated much on the minds of our lower people, who
during the present calamity have not shewn the slightest
discontent'. 114
The restoration of order was of urgent concern to thousands
f n. 110 cone. )

began to speak of forestallers. See Berrow's Worcester Ji, 23 July, 13 Aug. 1795; also
above, text at n. 36.
111 Reflecting upon another case, he noted, 'we had an opportunity of knowing
from the grand juries in different counties, that the decision gave great satisfaction':
R. v. M ajor, R. v. Arnold, cited in Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 119-22.
112 Thomas Pownall, Considerations on the Scarcity and High Price s of Bread-Corn
and Bread at the Mark et (Cambridge,1795 ), 10, 50, 53.
113 Sir Thomas Parker to Sir John Eardley Wilmot, Park Hall (Staffs.), 7 Sept.
1756: Beinecke Library, Yale University, Osborne Lee papers, Osborne files.
114 Above, n. 43.

of country magistrates while Kenyon was hearing the marketing
cases in King's Bench. The largest and most violent food riots of
the entire century took place during these months115 and the
desperate correspondence received by the Home Secretary was
undoubtedly paralleled by equally desperate direct appeals to the
judges when they met their grand jurors on circuit. Food prices
were so high that forty per cent of the population in the Midlands
could not have bought enough bread to survive even if they had
spent the entire family income on nothing else. 116 Doctors warned
of epidemic disease, but magistrates warned of desperation, and,
increasingly, insurrection. Their paternalism and their attempts
to restore public order were inextricably entwined. The Revd
Alexander Bunn Haden, the most energetic Staffordshire magistrate, despaired by May 1800 of effective parliamentary action
against cheating millers. He appealed to the Home Secretary:
As a Conservator of the Peace, I shall always stand forward to protect it:
but I never can attempt it, at the hazard of my Life, for the enriching of
one part of the Community & supporting them in the most glaring Act
of Oppression at the Expence of the Comforts, Happiness & even the
Existence of the Other.

He cited instances of farmers withholding supplies, relying on
their armed force in the Association Movement to suppress riot,
and millers who engrossed and doubled the price of wheat that
Haden himself had had sold at an affordable price. 117 A spirited
correspondence ensued, in which Haden stood by his comments
on market prices in the face of increasingly sharp admonitions
from the Home Secretary to protect the property of millers and
farmers. By October 1800, Haden was apologizing for the
strength of his criticisms of farmers and middlemen ('Your Grace,
no doubt, has the best Information on the Subject'), but he would
admit no more than 'I am satisfied that the high price of Grain
is not entirely owing to the cause [Combination] I have attributed
it'. 118 Magistrates doubted the policy of freeing markets from
115 See Wells,

Wretched Faces, passim .

Douglas Hay, 'War, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The Record
of the English Courts', Past and Present, no. 95 (May 1982), 129-32.
117 Revd Alexander Bunn Haden to Portland, Bilston, 10, 16 May 1800: PRO, HO
42/50, fos. 48-9. See also Aris ' Birmingham Gaz., 3 June 1795, for Haden's activity
that year.
118 Revd Alexander Bunn Haden to Portland, Bilston (Staffs.), 27 Sept. 1800: PRO,
HO 42/51, fos. 609-10; Haden to Portland, Bilston, 2 Oct. 1800: PRO, HO 42/52,
fos. 421-2; Portland to Haden, 14 May 1800: PRO, HO 43/ 11, fos. 485-7; Portland
to Haden, 30 Sept. 1800: PRO, HO 43112, fos. 194-6.
116

controls, but they also doubted their ability to maintain order,
faced with the most massive riots of the century, without lawful
powers to control market abuses or at least promise to do so. By
the summer of 1801, Haden was desperately demanding troops:
'nine-tenths of the inhabitants are of the lowest Class . . . in case
a Riot should break out in the dead of the Night . . . what is to
become of me, my Family and Property during the long interval
that must take place before the soldiers can arrive?' 119
Kenyon's reanimation of the common-law offences was very
popular with many country and borough magistrates who thought
in these terms. When the first conviction of Waddington was
achieved at Worcester at the end of July 1800, Kenyon brought
the good news to them as quickly as possible. He was sitting at
assizes at Chelmsford and an express rushed the verdict to him
from Worcester, so that he could inform the Essex grand jury
that 'a most respectable jury' of the county of Worcester had
found Waddington guilty on every count. 120 Inthe months following, local prosecution initiatives proliferated, at both the county
and borough levels. At Oxford, for example, influential citizens
suggested petitioning parliament for legislation to punish the
marketing offences summarily, and the county justices suggested
similar legislation to deal with frauds by mealmen and bakers.
Oxford City Council announced a subscription to prosecute
offenders and offered a reward, advertising these decisions by
handbills and instructing the mayor to employ informers in the
city markets. In Nottingham (where there were intense food riots
in September), resolutions of local gentlemen and farmers called
for action against profiteers and a new statute; there were similar
resolutions at Chesterfield, Kidderminster and Worcester; an
association to prosecute profiteers was formed in Middlesex. 121
Kenyon was aware of the realities and the dangers of massive
public disorder in London. In November, shortly before the
119 Haden to Portland, Bilston, 31 July 1801: PRO, HO 42/62, fos. 326-7. I am
indebted to Malcolm Thomas of Friends' House Library, London, for this and other
material from PRO, HO 42.
120 Summary of the Trial, 92. It was in fact a city jury (Worcester city held its own
assizes), before whom Waddington had doubted he would receive a fair trial.
121 Nottingham J I, 6 Sept. 1800; Wells, Insurrection, 45; Chesterfield resolutions, 8
Sept. 1800; also Middlesex resolutions, 23 Sept. 1800: PRO, HO 42/51, fos. 406-9;
similarly, Kidderminster, 15 Sept., Worcester, 10 Oct. 1800: PRO, HO 42/52; Oxford
Council Acts, 1752-1801, ed. Hobson, 276-7 (3 Sept. 1800); Jackson's Oxford JI, 27
Sept., 15 Nov. 1800. I owe these latter references to Wendy Thwaites. In general,
see PRO, HO 42/51-2.

judgement on Waddington, Lady Kenyon wrote from London to
her son about a threatened riot on Kennington common, but felt
confident that the authorities were alert. 122 Perhaps she and
Kenyon were also reassured by the six huge blunderbusses that
the Chief Justice had ordered the year before from Mssrs Boulton
and Watt of Birmingham. 123 But Kenyon's conviction, that establishing a modern precedent would lead to the restoration of public
order, had already been called into serious question by the unexpected consequences of Rusby's conviction for regrating in early
July 1800, the first case tried by the Chief Justice.
The special jury in Rusby's case were twelve merchants, a fact
that Kenyon made much of at a later stage of the case. 124 The
evidence was conflicting as to whether Rushy indeed had resold
oats, as charged in the indictment, but Kenyon disparaged the
awkward testimony, suggesting perjury, and gave a virtual
instruction to convict. He invited the jury to imagine the extreme
case: 'Suppose a rich man were to be placed at every avenue of
this town, who was to purchase up every article of provisions
destined for the supply of the metropolis, and to sell the articles
so purchased from hand to hand, increasing the price at every
sale, what, in that case, would become of the poor consumer?
This is an evil of an alarming magnitude, and every exertion to
stem the torrent, in courts of justice, must be highly beneficial'.
The Times, in its report, quoted Kenyon as explicitly calling for
the jurors to establish a 'precedent' to end the afflictions of the
poor. It is not surprising that they 'almost instantly' found Rushy
guilty.12s
Very high prices continued through the summer. On
15 September, a mob organized through handbills hissed and
shoved and threw mud at the mealmen going into the corn market
122 Lady Kenyon to the Hon. George Kenyon, London, 10 Nov. [1800]: Kenyon
MSS, box 24.
123 'deadly instruments each capable of killing 50 men at a shot (more I believe
than his Lordship's mouth ever sent from this world at one judgement . . . )': M. R.
Boulton to James Watt, 4 Feb. 1799: Birmingham City Archives, Boulton and Watt
Collection, parcel B.
124 On the proceedings in a motion for a new trial, 24 November, see Bell's Weekly
Messenger, 30 Nov. 1800.
125 Times, 5 July 1800, quotes Kenyon in his peroration blaming jobbers not simply
for an increase in price, but an increase of 50 per cent. On receiving the verdict,
Kenyon invited the prosecutors of Rushy to proceed against his partner Smith on the
basis of the evidence Smith had given in Rusby's defence, that he had been the one
who had resold the oats. Kenyon MSS, nisi prius from 4 July to 3 December 1800;
Bell's Weekly M essenger, 6 July 1800; date of trial given as 4 June in error.

at Mark Lane. The Lord Mayor came to reason with the crowd,
but eventually read the Riot Act when they began throwing stones
and brickbats at the constables. Finally, after sporadic attacks on
bakers' shops, the mob went at midnight to the house of Rushy
and entirely gutted it, as the property of the man who had been
marked out and convicted before the Chief Justice as a social
enemy. It was already clear to critics of Kenyon that his words
had exposed many dealers to grave danger and given enormous
encouragement to the mob. 126
Two months later, Law, acting for Rushy, moved for a new
trial on the grounds that several counts in the indictment had not
been proved. In his address to the court, he made much of 'the
sufferings of the defendant in consequence of the popular clamour
against him'. 127 The arguments on the motion were heard
24 November and, when Law again referred to the 'lawless
violence' from which Rushy had suffered at the hands of the
mob, Kenyon (who said he was ignorant of these acts) promised
the fullest punishment for any of the rioters who had taken
advantage of Rusby's conviction; however, he stated in the most
unequivocal terms that he agreed with the verdict, found by the
twelve merchants, 'men of great understanding and undoubted
integrity'. And he repeated his sentiments that, although commerce was the 'very pillar of the state', 'Free Commerce -Free
Commerce! was a very captivating expression' that could not be
allowed to justify rich men perverting the markets to the misery
of the poor. Justices Grose and LeBlanc concurred in the refusal
of a new trial. 128
At this point, Law abandoned any attempt to convert the judges
to political economy and opened a new argument on what he
termed 'merely . . . a dry question of law'. No evidence could be
found of a prosecution for regrating (buying and selling on the
same day, in the same market or one nearby), before the statute
126 'Chronicle' (14 Sept.), in Annual Register, xiii (1800), 33ff.; letter from Harvey
Christian Coombe, Lord Mayor of London, 19 Sept. 1800: PRO, HO 42/51, fo. 284;
also in the same volume, Fitzwilliam to Portland, Wentworth, 3 Sept. 1800: fos. 6-11;
Revd David Hughes to Portland, Temple House, 19 Sept. 1800: fos. 197-8; Wells,
Wretched Faces, 128ff. An extraordinary instance of the danger of encouraging the
mob was reported after the 1796 attack on the king: a man was prosecuted at Lewes
assizes for saying, 'Damn the King; I wish they had stoned him to death -he is a
monopolizer, and a forestaller, and I wish his head on Temple Bar': M anchester Gaz.,
6 Aug. 1796.
127 Bell's Weekly Messenger, 9 Nov. 1800.
128 Times, 26 Nov. 1800; Bell's Weekly Messenger, 30 Nov. 1800.

of Edward VI, and that had been repealed in 1772. That is, the
offence of regrating was not an offence at common law. On this,
Kenyon granted him a rule to show cause why the judgement
should not be arrested. 129 But where had the courts arrived at by
this point, in terms of public policy rather than 'dry questions of
law?' For it would be surprising, in view of what has been
revealed about the cases, if the judges were thinking of nothing
but old precedents in deciding Rusby's case. There was, in fact,
a gradually dawning realization that two practical problems
resulted from the policy of the court.
Law emphasized one of them in increasingly lurid detail. If the
provisions of the statute of 6 Edward VI were carried out, 'this
great and populous city must become a desert; all large aggregate
bodies of people, wherever collected, must disperse, and betake
themselves to the woods and fields, and seek their immediate
nourishment like the other live stock upon the farm, and from
the very soil which produces it. If the common law be the
perfection of reason, can this be common law?' 13° Kenyon dismissed the argument that Londoners would starve if middlemen
were banished: 'I say that it is not warranted'. But the argument
was in fact a potentially crucial one, and Law pressed it again
when Waddington's second trial came on a few weeks later:
middlemen were indispensable to unite in one market distant
producers with London consumers. 131
Meanwhile, some counsel were becoming aware of unintended
consequences of the prosecutions. 132 The attack on Rusby's property showed that Kenyon's unnuanced hostility to all middlemen
was, in its enthusiasm and venom, having the opposite effects on
popular opinion to those that had been envisaged. Rather than
calming the mob by showing that the law was active, Kenyon's
rhetoric was greeted by the poor of London as yet another genteel
sanction for the food riot. The September attack on Rushy was
now followed, in December, by extremely widespread rioting in
London, the most serious food riots in the capital in the eighteenth
Bell's Weekly Messenger, 30 Nov. 1800; Times, 28 Nov. 1800 (reporting 27 Nov.).
Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 2-3, 62-3; Summary of the
Trial, 36, 50; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 139.
131 Times, 9 Dec. 1800. Law may have been aware that traders at Mark Lane had
129

130

communicated their alarm about their personal security to the Lord Mayor and the
Home Secretary: letter by Harvey Christian Coombe, Lord Mayor of London, 6 Oct.
1800: PRO, HO 42/52, fo. 163.
132 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 4 (comments of Garrow).

century. They began within a week of Waddington's conviction
before Kenyon for the Kent offence.
Through these later months of 1800, although the king may
have supported Kenyon's position, criticism of the Lord Chief
Justice, both in private and in public, mounted. His 'exultation'
at convictions, his ignorance and prejudices, were increasingly
blamed for the riots and attacks on property, and for the 'monstrous and cruel usage' of men like Rusby. Certainly the mob
claimed his sanction: they papered inflammatory handbills on the
Monument; they painted walls with slogans, 'No hoarders -no
grinders of the poor -Lord Kenyon, and down with the mealmen'; and they sang ballads in honour of him. Kenyon, his critics
said, incited disorder and wakened oppressive doctrines, so that
the common law seemed an 'incomprehensible, unknown,
undefined but superior power' waiting to punish acts, 'which
have been proclaimed aloud, by the omnipotent voice of
Parliament, to be the only genuine and true sources of national
prosperity and commercial greatness'. Richard Brinsley Sheridan
publicly criticized the Lord Chief Justice; there was talk of
impeachment. The duke of Portland privately deplored the popular ignorance and violence encouraged by 'the indiscreet & ever
to be lamented doctrines which were promulgated from the Bench
in the course of the Assizes'. J. Symonds, professor of modern
history at Cambridge, attributed some of the rioting to 'the
intemperate language so extra-judicially used'. 133
The Lords' committee investigating dearth reported on
15 December, the day that the London riots broke out, that they
had not found anything but normal and laudable dealings by
dealers. 134 Yet Kenyon and his brother judges did not initially
draw back. In late January and early February 1801, when
133 Kenyon, Life of Kenyon, 372; Fitzwilliam to Portland, 3 Sept. 1800: PRO, HO
42/51, fos. 6-11; John Graves Simcoe, 27 Mar. 1801: PRO, HO 42/61, fos. 351-3;
'Chronicle', in Annual Register, xiii (1800), 212; [Sir Thomas Turton], An Address to

the Good Sense and Candour of the People, in Behalf of the Dealers in Corn: With Some
Few Observations on a Late Trial for Regrating, by a Country Gentleman (London,

1800; internal date of 30 Sept. 1800), 13, 15, 18, 136-7, 152; Portland to Henry
Dundas, 12 Oct. 1800: Nottingham University, Portland MSS, PwV 111; Wells,
Wretched Faces, 245; Autobiography of Arthur Young, ed. M. B. Edwards (London,
1898), 344-5. Turton's lengthy pamphlet is a full defence of the wisdom of Smith
and Burke, of the 1772 repeal and of the injured innocence of Rushy; the evidence,
logic, and justice against his conviction is examined in detail in a very explicit critique
of Kenyon's conduct of the case. There was a second edition later that year.
134 Second Report, Lords Committee to Consider the Dearth of Provisions: Ordered to
be Printed 15th December 1800 (London, 1800), 21-2.

Waddington was finally sentenced on his two convictions, the
judges still were determined to castigate speculators. But they
faced a delicate balancing of priorities. They wanted to make an
example with a severe sentence (to deter others), yet in terms
that would meet the objections of those who said that such
prosecutions were an interference with property. Moreover, they
needed to do so without further encouraging the poor to take
matters into their own hands. In particular, they had to ensure
that the provisioning of London was not interrupted by mob
action.

v
WHY WADDINGTON?

The warning to the mob, and the justification for interference
with markets and property, were entwined in the sentence passed
on Waddington on 28 January 1801 for the Worcester offence.
By sending Waddington to prison for a month (he had already
been there for many weeks) and fining him £500, Mr Justice
Grose, who had been one of Kenyon's most enthusiastic supporters, emphasized the importance of the precedent now firmly
established on the common law found 'in our ablest Reporters
and Commentators'. 135 The security of property and commerce,
far from being threatened by the judges, was a value to which
they had sacrificed human lives:
God forbid this Court should do any thing which interferes with the legal
freedom of trade! In support of this, the Law has declared that to violate
the freedom of trade by intercepting commodities in their way to the
market, taking them from the owners by force, or obliging the owners to
accept a less price than that at which they were willing to sell them, and
carrying them away against their will, or committing like violence on the
owners in the market, is a capital offence, for which men have forfeited
their lives to the Law.

This reference to capital convictions and executions was both a
warning to would-be rioters and a justification for the doctrine
on markets:
The Law, therefore, so far protects the freedom of trade, as it encourages
men to bring their goods to market; and punishes those who by acts of
135 Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 186. While in prison Waddington was
said to have sold a ton of potatoes daily, and 'appropriated the proceeds to the benefit
of his poorer fellow prisoners': T. C. Turberville, Worcestershire in the Nineteenth
Century (London, 1852), 111.

violence would deter them from doing so. The same Law, which protects
the rich against the violence of the poor, also protects the poor man
against the avarice of the rich. And from all time it has been the object
of the Law to prevent the enhancement of the price of merchandise
coming to market, and peculiarly the price of the necessaries of life, for
the purpose of enriching a single individual. 136

The judges thus constructed their final argument not out of law,
but out of natural justice, a common-law kind of equity. 137 The
argument that hangings could be avoided through controls
on freedom of trade was a familiar one to country gentlemen. 138
Two weeks later, sentencing Waddington for the second
offence, Grose remarked on 'the speculations of gamblers, . . .
the avarice of the rich', and 'the apathy of those who wrapped
up in themselves, were forgetful of the relative duties they owed
to their fellow-creatures'. He also adverted to 'the merciless
quality of the crime'. 139 He seemed to journalists 'extremely
anxious' to impress Waddington with his guilt, and passed a
sentence of another £500 fine and another three months imprisonment, to commence at the expiration of his first sentence. 140 The
heavy sentence appears to have been based not only on what
Waddington did in Kent and Worcester.
For Waddington was a Jacobin. He had been expelled from
the Surrey troop of light horse for his radical politics and had
attacked Burke in print for slandering the French and their
revolution. Kenyon emphasized several times in the case that he
did not know Waddington (although he admitted to knowing his
family). 141 It is likely that the entire bench knew of Waddington's
notoriety. Certainly by June 1800 they had had direct evidence
of his politics, because his Appeal to the British Hop Planters had
a passage attacking the war with France (an 'ensanguined field,
reeking with the blood of thousands - PREMATURELY
SLAIN!'), and another denouncing the 'dignified orders' of
136
137

Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 186-7.
Atiyah's use of the outcome of the cases as illustrations of this tendency in

eighteenth-century law, including private law, is thus only part of the story. The
judges' own justification is presented explicitly in such terms.
138 Buckingham, in his letter of 8 July 1800, noted that he had prosecuted Thomas
Battams after dealing with rioters 'whose lives would have been forfeited, if they had
been prosecuted for the heavy offence of plundering the corn-waggons': Buckingham
to Kenyon, Stowe, 8 July 1800: Kenyon MSS, box 23; Kenyon, Life of Kenyon, 374-6.
139 Times, 12 Feb. 1801.
140 Bell's Weekly Messenger, 15 Feb. 1801.
141 Times, 21 Nov. 1800. Actually, Kenyon only said that, to the best of his
knowledge, 'I have never seen his person before', a rather different claim.

England: 'Degen'rate sons! of Britain's fall'n race I Honor's dishonor, and Fame's last disgrace!'
By November the judges were even angrier. Waddington's
Summary of his trial, his appeal to public opinion over the court,
compared witnesses against him to spies in 'the old regime of
France' 142, and compared Kenyon's behaviour to the most political and oppressive acts of Lord Mansfield, bolstering the argument with a long quotation from the notorious libel on that Chief
Justice by Junius. 143 In court, Waddington argued on his own
behalf at one point, citing to Kenyon a defence of Horne Tooke,
who in a famous action ten years before had humiliated Kenyon
in open court. 144 And Waddington published yet another attack
on the court while he was waiting for judgement.
Such effrontery received the treatment it deserved. Lady
Kenyon reported to the family:
Lord Kenyon has sent my Geo.[Kenyon] a paper to see a very Impudent
advertizement Waddington has published since he was Confined, which I
fancy he will repent for they have delayed giving judgement till next term
that he may have leisure during his imprisonment to consider & humble[?]
his Tone of thinking and acting. 145

Waddington's politics probably added extra edge to Kenyon's
distaste for the man. 146 But the issue of politics was more than a
personal one. Erskine and another of the prosecution lawyers
made glancing reference to Waddington's evil motives and private
life, demanding an exemplary punishment. 147 This was probably
a reference to the belief that, if there were machinations in the
market-place, they were in part instigated by Jacobins in order
to increase suffering and foment revolution.
In
short,
Waddington, if he had not actually manipulated the market with
Summary of the Trial, 66 n.
52-9; see Hay, 'Contempt by Scandalizing the Court', 476.
144 Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, 59ff.; Proceedings in the Cause the
King v. Waddington, 6.
145 Mary, Lady Kenyon to her sisters, 29 Nov. (1800]: Kenyon MSS, no. 1429; this
part of the letter is not printed in HM C Kenyon, 558. She meant that sentence had
been delayed (until 28 January 1801); judgement was given 28 November 1800. See
also Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 6-7; Times, 29 Nov. 1800.
146 He wrote home from Maidstone, while on circuit in July 1801: 'The hops and
corn promise most extremely well indeed. They say hops will be very cheap, and
that the speculators will suffer much. It is said a dealer in this town will lose by his
monopolising scheme from twenty thousand to forty thousand pounds. Waddington,
I understand, is very unpopular now, and likely to feel very reduced circumstances':
Kenyon, Lzfe of Kenyon, 386-7.
147 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 4, 11.
142

143 Ibid.,

the intention of fomenting revolution, was the kind of man the
judges were sure would exult in such an outcome. 148
The belief was plausible. The marketing cases were contentious, contradictory in their effects and the interpretations they
provoked, precisely because they encapsulated a critical moment
in the history of classical political economy and also in popular
economic beliefs. Not only was there widespread disagreement
among country gentlemen and the highest judges and the government as to the merits of Adam Smith versus ancient law; there
were also strong cross-currents in popular opinion. Food rioters
throughout the land stood with Lord Kenyon, but many Jacobins,
including not only Waddington but also Thomas Paine himself,
were persuaded that free markets, in the cloth halls of the northern textile industry, in some labour markets and even in foodstuffs, were ineluctably part of individual freedom, the freedom
from aristocratic government. By 1779, during his time in
Philadelphia, Paine had come to oppose market controls. 149
Waddington and many other radicals, including Cobbett, believed
or claimed that the prosecution had in fact been instigated by
'Pitt's myrmidons' in order to punish Waddington for his politics.150 Given Pitt's opposition to the old laws, this seems highly
unlikely, however much he liked to gaol Jacobins: Waddington's
conviction apparently created a precedent that sustained a theory
of markets that Pitt deplored. Believing that he had been convicted of an offence abolished by parliament in 1772, Waddington
tore up a copy of the statute in the court, exclaiming, 'most
disgraceful! most disgraceful!' 151 The irony is that the prime minister and most of the government agreed with him.
On his release from King's Bench prison, where he had spent
twenty-seven weeks, he was given a hero's welcome in Kent.
148 This belief was reported from Lichfield by Richard George Robinson to
Liverpool in the autumn of 1800: Brit. Lib., Add. MSS 38,234, fo. 170. See also Aris'
Birmingham Gaz., 28 July 1800, reprinting from the London Packet.
149 Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (London, 1976), ch.
5.
Bentham remarked with respect to 'interference of government': 'I leave it to Adam
Smith, and the champions of the rights of man . . . to talk of invasions of natural
liberty', quoted in Atiyah, Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 326.
150 W. T. Sherwin, Memoirs of the Life of Thomas Paine (London, 1819), 132-5;
William Cobbett, American Register (Arlington, 1816), 329, has an account of the
trial; see also his Rural Rides, ed. George Woodcock (Harmondsworth, 1967), 179;
'S. F. Waddington to Lord Chief Justice Abbott, 12 Jan. 1825', Republican, 21 Jan.
1825. I owe the last reference to James Epstein.
151 Bell's Weekly Messenger, 1 Feb. 1801.

First came a celebratory feast at Tunbridge Wells. Hop planters
then took the horses from his carriage 'covered with wreaths of
hopbine', and drew him by relays of men the twelve miles to
Maidstone. He made a triumphal speech to cries of 'Waddington
and the freedom of commerce', and a subscription was begun on
his behalf. 152 But despite this his legal costs appear to have
ruined him. 153
Grose and Kenyon had repeatedly urged the importance of
such a precedent as they now appeared to have. Yet the policy
argument of supplying London was not a trivial one. The old
laws might make some sense in local markets, but the corn
exchange and Smithfield were ramified with practices that
threatened to expose hundreds of traders to prosecutions and,
indeed, convictions, especially for regrating. It was at this point,
when Kenyon was coming under very strong criticism from
within government and a significant part of public opinion, that
Law and the other counsel still defending Rushy elaborated the
newly minted argument that regrating -the crucial question in
the corn and meat markets of London -could not, by the most
exhaustive examination of the ancient statutes and cases, be shown
to have been an offence before the statute of 5 & 6 Edward VI.
It had been repealed; the offence therefore no longer existed. 154
On 31 January the court granted a rule to show cause why
152

Turberville, Worcestershire in the Nineteenth Century, 112.

153

In his 1811 petition to the prince of Wales he described his ruin: to support his

family (he was married with eight children) he had to depend on 'the benefactions
of intelligent and philanthropic people'. He petitioned for a position in the customs
or elsewhere; he was refused a year later. In 1812 he appealed to Liverpool, and also
wrote to Eldon and Ellenborough (who, as his counsel in 1800, had played a part in
his financial ruin), again seeking a position, and again without results. He petitioned
the prince again in July 1814, reminding him of his wrongful conviction for diverting
money from 'the harpy fangs of intermediate agents . . . into the hands of the
industrious cultivators of the soil'. He proceeded to enveigh against the predominance
of Jews (another monopoly, in his eyes) in the victualling of the navy. PRO, HO
42/116, fos. 144-5, petition of Samuel Ferrand Waddington to the Prince Regent,
Tonbridge Wells, 4 July 1811, enclosed with a letter from Waddington to the Prince
Regent, Southboro Tonbridge, 4 July 1811; attached minute, 'not advised to take any
step in consequence of it', 12 Aug. 1812; Waddington to Liverpool, 11 June 1812:
Brit. Lib., Add. MSS 38,248, fo. 20; also R. Willmott's draft reply to Waddington
of 26 June 1812: 'Lord L acknowledged receipt, informs you that he is wholly
unacquainted with the circumstances of your case, has referred letter to the Home
Department': Brit. Lib., Add. MSS, 38,248, fo. 126; Brit. Lib., Add. MSS 38,258,
fo. 198, petition of Waddington to the Prince Regent, 21 July 1814.
154 For a summary of counsel's arguments, see Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise
of Criminal Law, 4 vols. (London, 1816), ii, 536-7, n. r.

judgement should not be arrested, and, following the arguments
of counsel, the judges were divided.
This inconclusive outcome on regrating, and Waddington's
convictions for forestalling and engrossing in November 1800 and
February 1801, marked the end of Kenyon's campaign. In the
event, no judgement was ever given in Rusby's case: the prosecution was absolutely discharged a few years later. A few other
cases that had been progressing through the labyrinthine procedures of King's Bench resulted in acquittals in 1801, or were
dropped. 155 The common law had triumphed through its ambiguity. A Jacobin engrosser had been publicly and severely punished;
the justice of the law's interference with commerce had been
vindicated. But, with the sudden discovery by the judges that
regrating no longer existed as an offence, the pressing practical
danger to the London markets had been adroitly avoided. Lord
Holland, who attributed Kenyon's hostility to middlemen to
ignorance, concluded that in the end, the Lord Chief Justice
rather ignobly capitulated to the Ministry. 156 It seems more likely
that, when he died in 1802, Kenyon, if not his brothers on the
bench, still believed that he was right to enforce the marketing
laws, and probably hopeful that the new precedent in Waddington
would curb the evil for the foreseeable future.
VI
CONCLUSION

Kenyon was not to know that his successor as Lord Chief Justice
was to be Edward Law, now Lord Ellenborough, who as
Waddington's counsel had lectured his predecessor on the wisdom
of the market. 157 Ellenborough displayed his ideological commitment to Smithian economics in a number of ways. 158 He doubtless
also believed the two public-order arguments that had discredited
155 Edward Edwards, the prosecutor in three of them (removed by certiorari from
Essex and Middlesex), was himself successfully prosecuted for an offence in Kent
(Appendix ).
156 Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, i, 167-9.
157 Of which his father, Dr Edmund Law, Master of Peterhouse at mid-century,
had not heard: 'Last week I called a meeting of the heads, who heartily concurred in
endeavouring to break a combination of ingrossers and forestallers that had almost
ruined our market ': see letter by Law to an unspecified Lord, 20 Jan. 1756: Brit.
Lib., Add. MSS 32,862, fo. 163.
158 I deal with this in forthcoming work.

Kenyon's stand. If the old laws were enforced, the middlemen
upon whom the supply of large urban markets, especially London,
depended, could not trade, and the supply of food would be
greatly disrupted, with all the dangers of riot that that entailed
for the early modern state. The second danger lay in the fact that
Kenyon's analysis of the mood of the people was wrong: far from
reassuring them that the authorities were acting, denunciations
of middlemen from the bench encouraged the mob to riot. Rusby's
house had been destroyed shortly after he had been declared a
social parasite by one of Kenyon's juries; the largest food riots in
the capital in a century had followed Kenyon's second conviction
of Waddington. More fundamentally, by 1802 the balance of
persuasion and coercion in the maintenance of public order had
changed in England, during the very months when Waddington
and Rushy were being prosecuted. There had been a massive
reinforcement of military power in England itself, as Pitt constructed barracks and thousands of troops were poured into the
Midlands and other parts of the country.
In short, Kenyon's theory of social pacification through invocation of the law was rapidly becoming irrelevant, at least in terms
of marketing. As one respected contemporary put it, 'doctrines
of most serious tendency had been propagated from the bench,
the bar, the hustings and the press, directly, although unintentionally, countenancing the popular passions and prejudices',
which incited the mob to acts of violence. 'What has saved us
lately, from conflagrations and massacres, but the country
happening to be in a state of armed preparation?' 159 Kenyon
and his brother judges had blundered into inflaming the mob.
Denouncing forestallers from the throne or the bench had always
been a calculated risk, and the purpose, calming anxiety about
the markets in order to prevent riot, was now becoming irrelevant
as Britain became an armed camp.
But Law, who as counsel for Waddington and for Rushy had
urged such arguments, and had also given Kenyon a seminar in
the Smithian market model, was by April 1802 Lord Chief Justice,
the guardian of the common law. Part of that law now was
Waddington's Case, an unequivocal and recent precedent. Or was
it? What was Ellenborough's attitude as a judge, rather than as
an advocate for a client?
159 [Sir Gilbert Blane], Inquiry into the Causes and Remedies of the Late and Present
Scarcity, (London, 1800).

At the time of Rusby and Waddington's cases, at least seven
other marketing prosecutions were under way in King's Bench.
But, as the price-crisis eased, most were dropped, resulted in
acquittals before juries or were found insufficient in law. One,
the prosecution of a Camarthen miller for engrossing very large
quantities of grain, was due to go before a jury in March 1802,
but Kenyon was ill (he died in April). The case never came
to trial. 160
Waddington, while still in prison early in 1801, tried to sue for
monies that he had advanced to a hop-grower on the value of his
crop, which had never been delivered to him, on a contract of
1799. He was nonsuited at spring assizes in Kent, on the grounds
that the written agreement had not been stamped, and the nonsuit
was confirmed in the court of Common Pleas. The few comments
of the judges suggest, however, that new arguments were being
rehearsed. Although Mr Justice Rooke used the fact that
Waddington's contract was 'a speculative bargain' rather than 'an
ordinary commercial transaction' to find against him, Mr Justice
Chambre explicitly referred to the legality of a contract for the
sale of growing hops for future delivery. 161
Once Ellenborough was on the bench it was evidently realized
that no convictions could be had, or would stand re-examination,
in King's Bench. In 1804, Rusby, who had been held to a recognizance until the disputed point of law on whether regrating was
an offence had been determined, was given a final and free
discharge. In 1806, Waddington sued the delinquent hop-grower
(or rather his executors) once more, this time in King's Bench,
Ellenborough's court. There, Waddington got a verdict and
judgement for £861 damages. The defendants appealed the judgement, having the case heard again on writ of error in Exchequer
Chamber. Their defence there was explicitly based on the precedent Kenyon had created in Waddington's criminal convictions:
that selling growing hops was the equivalent of forestalling and
that the statute of 1772 had not taken away the common-law
offences. The Chief Justice of Common Pleas, who headed the
court, rejected the argument from analogy on several grounds,
160 See

Appendix.
The suit was against executors of a deceased hop-grower, who like him had
failed to deliver all the hops on 22 acres which Waddington et al. had contracted in
November 1799 to buy at £10 per cwt; the nonsuit was on the ground that the
unstamped agreement could not be entered in evidence: Waddington et al. v. Bristow
et al., Executors of Simmons (9 June 1801), 2 Bosanquet & Puller 451; 126 ER 1379.
161

and explicitly endorsed parliament's will in 1772: 'After the 12
Geo. 3 we should expect a precise determination in point to
authorize us to hold such a contract against law'. 162
The realization that Waddington was being set aside as a precedent can be partially traced in the justicing handbooks. The 1805
edition of Bum's Justice of the Peace preceded a full account of
Waddington's Case with the comment, 'indeed lamentable would
be the plight of the public and of the state, were there no remedy
against practices which have been justly termed most heinous
offences against religion and morality, and against the established
law of the country'. 163 But the 1807 edition of Bacon's Abridgement
ignored Waddington and, by the 1810 edition of Burn, the account
of the case was considerably shortened. 164
The decisive change, however, came with Joseph Chitty's treatment of the offences in 1816, in the first edition of his influential
Practical Treatise on Criminal Law. In the absence of any further
decided cases, it was impossible to be absolutely certain of the
grounds on which King's Bench would dismiss prosecutions for
forestalling, regrating and engrossing. But Chitty's conclusion
was that the court would apply the tests of the criminal law in
the most stringent way to such accusations. For an act to be a
crime it had both to do harm and also be the product of knowing
or evil intent ( mens rea) on the part of the actor. Waddington
may have fit the latter if not the former requirement (there was
evidence on his trial that he had tried to organize growers to
drive up prices), but Rushy was probably more typical, in that
he was simply engaged in his usual practices of buying and
reselling, an essential link in the complex nexus of wholesale and
retail markets. It would be very hard to prove that such a man
intended to reap an unwarranted profit. But Chitty's interpreta162 Bristow and Others, Executors of Henry Simmonds v. Waddington and Others, in
Error, 20 Nov. 1806, 2 Bosanquet & Puller (N. R.) 355; 127 ER 664. Exchequer

Chamber, which heard cases appealed from King's Bench, consisted of the judges of
the other common-law courts. Waddington cited this decision in his petitions to the
Prince Regent.
163 Richard Burn, The Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer, 20th edn, 4 vols.
(London, 1805), ii, 358 (also in the 1814 edn). It provided forms of indictments for
each offence at common law, as did Thomas Walter Williams, The Whole Law Relative
to the Duty and Office of a Justice of the Peace, 2nd edn, 4 vols. (London, 1808), ii,
503-7, which also noted some unrepealed statutes. Neither cite Rusby on regrating
and both say that all three offences remain punishable at common law.
164 Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law, 7 vols., 6th edn (London, 1807),
iii, 261; see Hay, 'Moral Economy, Political Economy, and Law', for Bacon's treatment of the offence in earlier editions.

tion of the probable state of the law also pointed to the doubts
about what Kenyon had simply assumed: that engrossing, and
the other penalized acts, actually harmed anyone. Two cases in
particular were used by Ellenborough from the bench to show
that the reverse was in fact the case. The first, R. v. Webb et al.
(1811), was a prosecution against the partners of the Birmingham
Flour and Bread Company under the Bubble Act. Ellenborough
endorsed the finding of the jury that a company that bought very
large quantities of grain for the purpose of regularly supplying
Birmingham with bread and flour had a purpose 'not manifestly
tending to the common grievance', but one 'expressly found to
have been beneficial'. 165 In the following year, in Pratt v.
Hutchinson (1812), the issue of whether a company purpose was
beneficial was again raised, and the example in Webb again relied
upon. The year was a significant one, for prices were higher than
at any time since 1801 and there was widespread suffering and,
in many parts of the country, again near-insurrection. In these
circumstances, Ellenborough did not reactivate the common-law
offences; rather the reverse. 166
Although in both of these cases it was a jury that had made
the determination, Chitty concluded in 1816:
at the present day, it would probably be holden that no offence is committed unless there is an intent to raise the price of provisions by the conduct
of the party. For the mere transfer of a purchase in the market where it
is made, the buying articles before they arrive at a public market, or the
purchasing of a large quantity of a particular article, can scarcely be
regarded as in themselves necessarily injurious to the community . . . the
division of labour or occupations will in general occasion the commodity to
be sold cheaper to the consumer. 167

The reference to Smith is clear. Forestalling and perhaps regrating
continued to be attacked under local market regulations for some
years, but the common-law offences were dead.
They had a short afterlife in the manuals of justices of the
peace. In the 1820 edition of Burn, the encomium of the common
law quoted above was retained, but Chitty's strong endorsement
of Law's arguments was also quoted at length, complete with
165 R. v. Webb (1811) 14 East 406 (104 ER 658), at 421. The Company was said to
be a direct response to the dearth and high prices of 1795-6: see 14 East 409.
166 I discuss these cases more fully elsewhere.
167 My emphasis. Like Ellenborough when he argued before Lord Kenyon, Chitty
cited Wealth of Nations, as well as Webb, and Pratt v. Hutchison: Chitty, Practical
Treatise, ii, 528 n. h.

references to The Wealth of Nations, and to Rusby. 168 Finally, in
1837, the editor observed: 'This offence is now of rare occurrence,
or, at all events, the offender is rarely, if ever, proceeded against;
it is deemed, therefore, not necessary to insert any forms hereon'.
In 1844, when parliament passed An Act for Abolishing the Offences
of Forestalling, Regrating, and ingrossing . . . (7 & 8 Victoria, c.
24), which formally abolished the offences at common law or by
any statute and repealed a number of statutes earlier than those
repealed in 1772, as well as Irish and Scottish statutes, there was
not one word of debate.
I have argued here that the successive phases of criminalization
and decriminalization of the marketing offences can only be fully
explained when such contingencies as the idiosyncrasies of Chief
Justices and the short-term crises of harvest failure are taken into
account. But the marketing cases are also significant markers of
several fundamental processes in English society at the end of the
eighteenth century.
The acts and politics of Waddington as a defendant throw into
sharp relief the complicated and unresolved attitudes of wider
public opinion to classical political economy before the end of
the century. There were probably generational differences:
Kenyon trained as a lawyer in the 1750s, when the marketing
offences were accepted law (supported by Ellenborough's father,
among others). 169 But even in 1800 the acceptance by the parliamentary leaders of Smith's conclusions was opposed by a disparate
group of doubters. Evangelical reformers or sympathizers such
as Glasse, Girdler and Kenyon himself levelled a moral critique
against Smith. Traditionalist magistrates and others who prided
themselves on practical rather than theoretical knowledge
(Liverpool, Banks, probably the King) distrusted him. Military
officers often supported the old view for similar reasons: Erskine,
who had served in both the navy and army, was an instance; and
Warren Hastings advised close regulation of British markets in
1801, based on his experience in India in 1783.170 But political
and theoretical alignments were greatly complicated by the
endorsement of Smith by Jacobins, including Waddington
168

Unchanged in the 1825, 1830 and 1836 editions of Burn, Justice of the Peace and

Parish Officer.

Above, n. 157.
Salim Rashid, 'The Policy of Laissez-Faire during Scarcities', Econ. JI,
(1980), 500-1.
169

170

xc

(who dedicated one of his pamphlets to Pitt) and Tom Paine
himself.
The fact that Waddington and Rushy were prosecuted in such
a glare of publicity helped to bring about fundamental change.
The trials were a public seminar in market theory, in the details
of the wholesale trades, in the issues of public order. Smith's
critique had been directed at law, and these cases were the ultimate test of the argument that courts could beneficially criminalize certain kinds of contracting. The failure to establish a
precedent against regrating in 1801, and the destruction of
Kenyon's precedent against engrossing by the new Chief Justice
after 1802, powerfully endorsed the government's support of
non-intervention. (The most important politician of all who may
have continued to doubt, George III, was no longer in a position
to do so effectively after his final madness began in 1810.) The
repudiation of Waddington as a precedent became part of the
interconnected arguments that increasingly justified a new theory
of contract law, one attuned to the ideal of perfect markets rather
than to those of morality, custom or 'police', in its old sense. 171
These cases also call our attention to the immense change in
the nature of public-order calculations brought about by the
Revolutionary war. One of the oldest policy consideration behind
the marketing laws, preventing disorder by protecting the consumer, was suddenly outmoded, not only by the doubts about
the effects of the laws, but also because the massive armed force
created in the course of the war with Revolutionary France, a
large part of which was now garrisoned on the British public,
made it possible to weaken the regulatory state by strengthening
the policing state. Troops allowed the political elite to believe in
the practical possibility of free markets, as well as their theoretical
desirability.
Finally, the cases delineate some of the contours of the constitutional independence and political influence of the judiciary in this
period. Kenyon attended some cabinet councils, but did not sit
there as Mansfield had done continuously for some years, and
Ellenborough was to do for some months. None the less, like all
of the great eighteenth-century judges, he was a powerful political
figure when he wished to be. Often such influence was out of the
171 Atiyah, Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract; Douglas Hay and Nicholas Rogers,
English Society in the Eighteenth Century: Shuttles and Swords (Oxford, 1997), chs. 5-9.

public eye: advising on the Regency Crisis of 1788; questioning
political prisoners before the Privy Council; commenting on proposed legislation. But the marketing cases are a reminder -one
of many -of how large issues of public policy, hotly contested,
were in fact debated in the courts rather than in parliament, and
how important the influence of a powerful judge could be on
such debates, in directing verdicts, giving judgement and making
comments obiter. The most important common-law judges were
as much statesmen as was the Lord Chancellor, and the role was
expected of them. 172 After 1701, they were statesmen independent
of the administration when they wished to be.
Ellenborough's endorsement of Smith was not followed immediately everywhere in the common-law world. 173 There was independent Irish legislation of 1738 and 1746 punishing forestalling
and engrossing and neither it nor ancient statutes was affected
by the 1772 English repeal. 174 As in England, there was probably
confusion about what the new political economy meant. Sir
Richard Aston, in a charge to a Dublin jury in 1763, referred to
both the price mechanism and to the old laws with approval. 175
Moreover, traditionalists were still dominant in the Irish legislature. In 1774, a statute was passed that empowered any three of
the market jury of the City of Dublin to visit markets and
storehouses and shops, and to seize and condemn any provisions
'in the hands of forestallers, regrators, or ingrossers'; similar
powers were extended to other parts of Dublin by a statute of
1787.176 In September 1800, the Recorder of Dublin charged the
grand jury to present forestalling: 'A crime of such magnitude
ought, at all times, to be narrowly watched, and rigorously pun-

172 I make this argument in a book in progress, The Judges and the People: King's
Bench and the Criminal Law in English Politics and Society, 1750-1820 (forthcoming).
173 In Scotland, not a common-law jurisdiction, forestalling was an offence consid-

ered of such public importance (or delicacy) that prosecution was reserved for the
Lord Advocate, so that government policy rather than the wishes of private prosecutors was decisive: Douglas Hay and F. Snyder, 'Using the Criminal Law, 1750-1850:
Policing, Private Prosecution, and the State', in Douglas Hay and F. Snyder (eds.),
Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850 (Oxford, 1989), 29. See also J. Erskine,
An Institute of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1773), 765-6.
174 11 Geo. II, c. 11 (1738); 19 Geo. II, c. 17 (1746), cited in Sir Richard Bolton,
A Justice of Peace for Ireland, ed. Michael Travers (Dublin, 1750), 269-70.
175 Charges to the Grand Jury, ed. Lamoine, 405.
176 13 & 14 Geo. III, c. 22, s.73 (1774); 27 Geo. III, c. 46, s. 3 (1787); both were
repealed in 1844.

ished'. 177 The statutes continued to be cited in the standard Irish
justices' handbook into the nineteenth century. 178
In the British North American colonies, perhaps especially
those with governments strongly influenced by military officers
of a traditional cast of mind, the wisdom of closely regulating
markets in foodstuffs was widespread. The rejection of such
legislation in Philadelphia during the American Revolution has
been mentioned. Ordinances of Quebec in 1777 and 1780 continued the market regulation common under the French regime
before 1760 and in the earlier period of British rule, defining and
setting penalties on forestallers, regrators and engrossers. 179 In
Nova Scotia, in British hands from 1713, there was legislation
against forestallers and engrossers enacted in 1758, 1766, 1778
and 1798, for food, hay, provisions and wood. From 1826, the
statutes were suspended repeatedly; they were repealed in
1847.180
These were colonies of British, or at least, European settlement.
In India and the rest of the non-white Empire, new economic
theory favoured at the highest level could be expressed as policy
and law much more quickly, particularly with lecturers like
Thomas Malthus at Haileybury. The governor of Bombay intervened actively during the famine of 1802-4, but by the time of
the Madras famine of 1806-7 policy was divided, with copious
references to Smith used to justify non-intervention. Henceforth,
famine in India largely was left to the mercies of the invisible
hand.181
The strength of the belief in theory is clear in the English case
and the abrogation of the marketing laws was, in many ways, a
crucial step in its advance. Supplying the consumer by direct
state intervention was one of the oldest and most developed
parts of the Tudor/Stuart regulatory state inherited by the
Hanoverians, even if in a decayed form. The issue of starvation
was the ultimate test of a commitment to political economy. Many
Quoted in Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 314.
Leonard MacNally, The Justice of the Peace for Ireland, 2 vols. (Dublin, 1808),
i, 676-7.
179 Quebec 17 Geo. III, c. 4 (1777); 20 Geo. III, c. 2 (1780), in Arthur G. Doughty,
Report of the Work of the Public Archives for the Years 1914 and 1915 (Ottawa, 1916;
sessional paper 29a of 1916), 60-2, 103-10.
180 32 Geo. II, c. 10 (NS); 6 Geo. III, c. 6 (NS); 17 Geo. III, c. 5 (NS); 38 Geo. III,
c. 4 (NS); SNS 1826, c. 20; SNS 1847, c. 66. I owe these references to Philip Girard.
181 Rashid, 'Policy of Laissez-Faire during Scarcities', 500-1; S. Ambirajan, Classical
Political Economy and British Policy in India (Cambridge, 1978), chs. 1, 3.
177
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economists on the Continent, theorizers of the free market, had
indeed drawn back in the 1770s from the extreme conclusion that
food markets were like other markets; in England, perhaps
because more of the population was above the line of subsistence,
they did not. 182 In 1801, faced with a far greater crisis, the English
judiciary (but not the government) also refused to abandon the
moral supervision of markets. But once that crisis had passed,
the political validation of Smithian economics was massively
advanced in England, and its empire.
York University, Toronto

Douglas Hay

182 R. W. Fogel, 'Second Thoughts on the European Escape from Hunger: Famines,
Chronic Malnutrition, and Mortality Rates', in S. R. Osmani (ed.), Nutrition and
Poverty (Oxford, 1992).

APPENDIX
MARKETING PROSECUTIONS IN KING'S BENCH 1799-1801*
28 Nov. 1799, John Rushy, yeoman ( certiorari by prosecutor Richard Snell,
from London City Quarter Sessions, for engrossing 90 quarters of oats at the
Corn Exchange, and another indictment for regrating 30 quarters ): for details,

see text. Sources: KB 10/51, pt 1, Hilary 40 Geo. III, nos. 4, 5; KB 15/6,
Hilary 40 Geo. III; KB 15117, Easter and Trinity 40 Geo. III; KB 21147,
350, 357, 362, 373, 409, 411, 433, 438; KB 21148, 337.
22 Jan. 1800, S. F. Waddington ( criminal information of 10 counts for engrossing
a large quantity of hops and making forehand bargains with intent to raise the
price, persuading persons not to carry hops to market, at M aidstone, Kent): for

details, see text. Sources: KB 11161, pt 1, Easter 1800, no. 2; KB 15/6,
Trinity 40 Geo. III; KB 15117, Michaelmas 41 Geo. III; KB 21/47, 344, 358,
395, 403, 436, 444, 454, 458, 467; KB 1130, Hilary 1800, affidavits of
Thomas Knipe, Edward Meredith, William Richmond (2), Thomas Ellis,
Peter Broadley et al.; also Trinity 1800, affidavits of William Richmond,
Samuel F. Waddington.
29 M ar. 1800, S. F. Waddington ( criminal information of 8 counts for spreading
and raising false rumours to enhance the price of hops, persuading dealers not to
bring hops to market, engrossing hops, at Worcester): for details, see text.

Sources: KB 11161, pt 2, Trinity 1800 no. 1; KB 15/6, Trinity 40 Geo. III,
10 July 1800; KB 15/17, Trinity 40 Geo. III; KB 21147, 344, 358, 369, 376,
396, 427, 439, 451; KB 1130, Easter 1800, affidavit of William Penn.
15 Sept. 1800, Richard Laycock, yeoman ( certiorari by prosecutor, Edward
Edwards, M ddx., for forestalling Smithfield of cows and calves): offence 13

Mar. 1800; indicted 15 Sept. 1800; 1 Dec. 1800 certiorari allowed; leave to
imparl, pleads not guilty Hilary 41 Geo. III. Sources: KB 10/51, pt 2,
Michaelmas 1800; KB 15/6, Michaelmas 41 Geo. III; KB 21/47, 435.

7 Oct. 1800, Yeats ( certiorari by prosecutor, Edward Edwards, from Chelmsford,
Essex Quarter Sessions, forestalling lambs at Rumford market): offence 1 Sept.

1800; indicted 7 Oct. 1800; certiorari allowed 7 Nov. 1800. Sources: KB
11161, pt 1, Michaelmas 1801, no. 25; KB 21/47, 411.
8 Oct. 1800, Richard M ansel Philipps Esq. ( certiorari by prosecutor, John
Davies, gent., from Carmarthen Quarter Sessions, for engrossing 4,000 quarters
of wheat, 6,000 quarters of barley, 3,000 lb of cheese, 6,000 quarters of oats):

offence 1 Mar. 1800; presented 8 Oct. 1800; certiorari 22 Oct.; leave to
imparl Michaelmas 41 Geo. III; 23 Jan. 1801 order to plead; 27 Jan. order
to plead; 31 Jan. order to plead; order for trial 4 Feb. 1802; 12 Feb. order
for special jury at instance of defendant; order for trial countermanded 11
Mar. 1802. Sources: KB 11/61, pt 1, Michaelmas 1800, no. 28; KB 15/6,
Michaelmas 41 Geo. III; KB 15/17, Hilary 42 Geo. III; KB 21/47, 444, 449,
454, 630.
8 Oct. 1800, Joseph Wood, brewer ( certiorari by defendant, from Newcastle on
Tyne Quarter Sessions, for enhancing price of barley): offence 27 Sept. 1800;

indicted 8 Oct. 1800; certiorari 12 Feb. 1801; leave to imparl Easter 41 Geo.
III; 25 June order for a jury of Northumberland at instance of defendant;
notice of trial 21 July 1801; 6 Nov. rule nisi for judgement for defendant.
Sources: KB 11161, pt 3, Easter 1801, no. 39; KB 15/6, Easter 41 Geo. III;
KB 15/17, 21 July 1801; KB 21/47, 542, 546.
13 Jan. 1801, Samuel Quarrel, butcher ( certiorari by prosecutor, William
Brundell, Essex Quarter Sessions, forestalling lambs): offence 1 Sept. 1800;

indictment 13 Jan. 1801; certiorari 12 Feb. 1801. Sources: KB 11/61, pt 3,
Easter 1801, no. 30.
13 Jan. 1801, Samuel M athers, butcher ( certiorari by prosecutor, Edward
Edwards, Chelmsford, Essex for forestalling lambs): offence 2 Sept. 1800;

indicted 13 Jan. 1801; certiorari 12 Feb. 1801. Sources: KB 11/61, pt 3,
Easter 1801, no. 29.
13 Jan. 1801, Samuel Judson, butcher ( certiorari by prosecutor, William
Brundell, Essex Quarter Sessions, for forestalling calves): offence 1 Sept. 1800;

indicted 13 Jan.1801; certiorari 12 Feb. Sources: KB 11/61, pt 3, Easter
1801, no. 28.
16 Jan. 1801, WilliamJosceline, yeoman, prosecuted by John Cowper, gentleman,
clerk of the peace for the borough ( certiorari by defendant, borough St. Albans,
Herts., regrating 7 loads of wheat): offence 29 Nov. 1800; indictment 16 Jan.

1801; certiorari 18 May 1801; leave to imparl, Michaelmas 41 Geo. III;
23 June by consent of prosecutor, ordered that defendant may sign judgement for want of a joinder in demurrer. Sources: KB 11161, pt 2, Trinity
1802, no. 17; KB 15/6, Trinity 41 Geo. III; KB 21147, 535, 536.
18 Apr. 1801 John Gilbert ( certiorari by defendant, City of Lincoln, engrossing
fish, geese, and duck s ): offence 24 Oct. 1800; indicted 18 Apr. 1801, traverses;

certiorari 12 Feb. 1801; leave to imparl Easter 41 Geo. III; 8 June order for
a concilium at instance of defendant; 17 June after hearing counsel both
sides, it is adjudged that the prosecution is insufficient in law, judgement
for the defendant (the judgement was found bad on demurrer for not
specifying quantities): R v. Gilbert, 1 Easter 582. Sources: KB 11/61, pt 3,

Easter 1801 no. 36; KB 15/6, Easter 41 Geo. III; KB 21/47, 512, 525; KB
21/48, 342.
Jan. 1801 Edward Edwards (Kent) for regrating a cow at Farningham fair:

Jan. 1801 indicted for regrating a cow at Farningham fair but not tried;
imprisoned in Fleet as of June 1801; removed on habeas corpus to Kent;
fined £50 and to be imprisoned 12 months, quarter sessions for Western
Division of Kent, Aug. 1801. Sources: KB 1/3111, Trinity 41 Geo. III no. 1,
no. 51, affidavit for habeas corpus to remove to Kent for trial; M anchester
M ercury, 11 Aug. 1801. (The fact that Edwards appears as both a prosecutor
and defendant in these cases suggests that he was a common informer,
skilled in the use of the law. He is perhaps the Edward Edwards who applied
for habeas corpus from Newgate in November 1791, after being arrested
for not having answered to an indictment for theft in Wiltshire in 1786:
PRO, KB 16/21/1.)

* Sources: The manuscript records of the Court of King's Bench in the
Public Record Office, London, consist of paper affidavits, many series of
parchment rolls and files, and a variety of registers. To reconstruct a case
it is usually necessary to use all or almost all of the series. Some of those on
the crown side of the Court are KB 1 (for the affidavits); KB 10 (London
and Middlesex criminal informations); KB 11 (out-county informations);
KB 15 (appearance and notice of trial books); KB 16 (returned writs); KB
21 (rule or order books); KB 29 (controllment rolls). An explanation of the
KB series is given in my Crown Side Cases in the Court of King's Bench
(Staffs. Hist. Soc., forthcoming).

